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The Death Penalty-An Obstacle to the
'War against Terrorism"?]
Thomas Michael McDonnell*

September 11 seared our collective memory perhaps even
more vividly than December 7, 1941, and has evoked a natural
demand both for retribution and for measures to keep us safe.
Given the existing statutory and judicial authority for capital
punishment, the U.S. Government has to confront the issue
whether to seek the death penalty against those who are linked
to the suicide attacks or to the organization that sponsored them
or both. Meting out the death penalty to international terrorists
involves difficult moral, legal, and policy questions. The
September 11 crimes were not only domestic crimes, but also
international ones. The magnitude of these crimes, the killing of
over 3,000 innocent people, cries out for redress.
Yet most countries i n the world, including nearly all our
closest allies, have abolished capital punishment. None o f the

1.
In my earlier drafts of this Article, I did not put quotation marks around
"war on terrorism." It has now become clear, however, that this phrase has not only
become unthinkingly part of the lexicon but is dangerously overbroad. One
commentator put it aptly:
Wars have typically been fought against proper nouns (Germany, say) for the
good reason that proper nouns can surrender and promise not to do it again.
Wars against common nouns (poverty, crime, drugs) have been less successful.
Such opponents never give up. The war on terrorism, unfortunately, falls into
the second category.
Grenville Byford, The Wrong War, FOREIGN AFF., July 2002, at 34, available at 2002
WL 2085047. Emergency measures put into effect because of the "war on terrorism"
may likewise never end, and governmental officials may justify military actions that
have little to do with our immediate security by invoking such a broad description of
the threat.
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, B.A., J.D., Fordham University.
I wish to thank Professors Donald L. Doernberg and John A. Humbach, both of Pace
University School of Law, and Christopher G. Wren, Assistant Attorney General,
Wisconsin Department of Justice, for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
I also wish to thank law librarians Margaret Moreland and Cynthia Pittson; my
administrative assistant Carol Grisanti; my research assistants Christina Kelly, Laura
Krawczyk, and William Onofry; and my wife, Kathryn Judkins McDonnell, whose
support helped make this Article possible. I dedicate this Article to my father, Joseph
T. McDonnell, attorney-at-law, whose work and concern for justice and fairness have
been a constant inspiration.
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four currently operating international criminal tribunals is
authorized to give a death sentence. I n addition, the advent of
the suicide bomber turns the deterrence justification for the
death penalty inside out. Might the death penalty help create
martyrs rather than discourage similar attacks? Could our
imposing the death penalty increase support i n the Islamic
world for a1 Qaeda and other extremist groups? Furthermore, to
what extent a s a matter of constitutional law and policy, should
a secondary actor, one who did not kill, but who was a member
of a terrorist conspiracy, be subject to the death penalty? This
Article examines these questions i n the context of the Zacarias
Moussaoui case, the supposed twentieth hijacker, who, on
September 11, 2001, had been held i n custody for twenty-six
days.
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V.

September 11 seared our collective memory perhaps even more
vividly than December 7, 1941, not only because, like Pearl Harbor,
the attack on the World Trade Center took us completely by surprise
or because the burning twin towers collapsed so unexpectedly and
spectacularly as we watched the horror unfold on our television sets,
but because the September 11 attacks constitute a virtually
unprecedented threat to our security and way of life. The attacks
have thus evoked a natural demand both for retribution and for
measures to keep us safe. To satisfy these demands, Congress created
the Department of Homeland Security2 and rushed to pass the

2.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
Congress passed a spate of measures in response to the September 11 attacks. See
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Patriot Act.3 The President has taken numerous steps, including,
among many others, the invasion of Afghanistan, the indefinite
incommunicado detention of alleged Taliban and a1 Qaeda leaders in
Guantanamo Bay, the establishment of military tribunals to try those
and other foreign terrorist suspects a t some unspecified date,4 the
incommunicado detention of two U.S. citizens without trial,5 the
detention of hundreds of immigrants thought to be linked to

Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned
by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZOL.
REV. 1657, 1705 n.227 (2003) (citing List of Legislation Related to September 11
Attacks, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/homelterrorleg.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2004)).
3.
U S A Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).Brought
about i n part b y Attorney General John Ashcroft's demand for immediate action, t h e
pace of passage was frenetic:
Passage o f t h e bill, b y a vote o f 337 to 79, was t h e climax of a remarkable 18hour period i n which both t h e House and the Senate adopted complex, farreaching antiterrorism legislation with little debate i n a n atmosphere of edgy
alarm, as federal law enforcement officials warned that another attack could be
imminent. Many lawmakers said it had been impossible to truly debate, or
even read, the legislation that passed today.
Robin Toner & Neil L. Lewis, A Nation Challenged, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much
Like Senate's, but With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. T I M E SOct.
,
13,2001, at B6.
4.
President George W . Bush, Executive Order: Notice-Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens i n the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1435652. Six of the Guantanamo Bay
detainees, however, may be tried fairly soon, according to Administration Officials. See
Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: The Tribunals; Six Detainees Soon May Face
Military Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at Al. T o date, none of the Guantanamo
detainees have been tried. T h e Pentagon, however, says it has released a total of 119
Guantanamo Bay detainees, leaving 610. U.S. Releases 26 Guantanamo Bay Detainees,
WASH. POST,Mar. 16, 2004, at A2.
5.
See Hamdi v . Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460-61 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla v .
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), remanded, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352
F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (answering certified questions and ruling, inter alia, that
President, as Commander i n Chief, lacked power to detain U.S. citizens on U.S. soil).
T h e U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari i n Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No.
03-6696, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 9, 2004). After t h e Supreme Court agreed to hear
his case, t h e Pentagon permitted Jose Padilla to meet with his lawyer. Michael Powell,
Lawyer Visits 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect, WASH.POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at A10. Padilla had
been held incommunicado for nearly two years. Id. Two agents listened to the
conversation conducted with a glass barrier between Padilla and his attorney. Id. T h e
meeting was also videotaped. Given t h e government's monitoring, his lawyer stated
that their conversation dealt only with his health and well-being, not legal matters. Id.
At about the same time and under similar constraints the Pentagon has allowed Yaser
Esam Hamdi to see an attorney after nearly two years o f incommunicado detention.
See Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court to Hear Detainee Case to Decide if Suspect i n 'Dirty
Bomb' Can Be Held, BOSTONGLOBE,Feb. 21,2004, at A2.
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t e r r o r i ~ m the
, ~ indictment of several suspected terrorists in federal
court,' and the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Unlike our European allies, the United States has relatively
~
the
little experience fighting a private terror o r g a n i ~ a t i o n .Given
magnitude of the attacks, we may tend to overreact, which may play
into the terrorists' hands. Overreaction may also erode our own
respect for the rule of law and our moral standing both a t home and
abroad. This Article deals with a fundamental question, namely,
whether, as a matter of law and policy, the federal government
should use the death penalty against those found to have been
involved in the September 11 attacks, in particular, and, more
broadly, against those who belong to or have allied themselves with a1
Qaeda.s
Meting out the death penalty to international terrorists involves
difficult moral, legal, and policy questions. The September 11 crimes
were not only domestic crimes, but also international ones. The
magnitude of these crimes, the killing of over 3,000 innocent people,
cries out for retribution. Yet most countries in the world, including
nearly all of our closest allies, have abolished capital punishment.1°
None of the four currently operating international criminal tribunals

See Center for National Security Studies v. Department of Justice, 331 F.3d
6.
918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that i n course of post-September 11 investigation,
government interviewed over 1,000 persons, detained 700 for violation of immigration
laws, 134 on federal criminal charges, and undisclosed number as material witnesses);
see also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A Year of Loss, Ch. 3: Treatment of
Immigrants, Refugees, and Minorities, at http://www.lchr.org/us~lawllossfloss~ch3a.
h t m (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
7.
See Indictment, United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocs/terrorisdusgoba
102102ind.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) (charging six individuals with conspiring to
aid terrorist organization, namely, a1 Qaeda); Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, A n
Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Organization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2003, at 1, 37 (noting that six of these "sleeper" cell defendants pleaded guilty to lesser
charges but stating that apparently FBI agent i n charge of case did not consider
defendants terrorists, but perhaps potential terrorists); The Nation i n Brief, WASH.
POST, May 22, 2003, at A36 (noting seventh person was indicted for participation i n
"sleeper" a1 Qaeda cell i n upstate New York); see also Indictment, United States v.
Battle, No. CR 02 399HA @. Or. Oct. 3, 2002) (charging four individuals with
conspiring to levy war against United States and with conspiring t o prove support and
resources to a1 Qaeda), available at http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslterrorisd
usbattle100302ind.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2004); United States v. Abdullah, No. 01
CR 3240-W (May 12, 2002); Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: The Law; 6 Persons
Charged under Broadly Worded Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,2002, at A17.
8.
See Jonathan Stevenson, How Europe and America Defend Themselves,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar-Apr. 2003, at 75.
9.
This Article does not address the question of whether to use the death
penalty i n war crimes tribunals i n Iraq. See Susan Dominus, Their Day in Court, N.Y.
TIMESMAG., Mar. 30, 2003, at 30. See generally, Capt. R. Peter Masterson, The Persian
Gulf War Crimes Trials, 1991 ARMYLAW 7 (1991).
10.
See Carol S. Steiker, The Law and Politics of the Death Penalty, 81 OR. L.
REV. 97, 97 (2002).
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is authorized to impose a death sentence.ll In addition, the advent of
the suicide bomber turns the deterrence justification for the death
penalty inside out. Might the death penalty help create martyrs
rather than discourage similar attacks? Could our imposing the death
penalty increase support in the Islamic world for a1 Qaeda and other
extremist groups? Furthermore, to what extent as a matter of
constitutional law and policy, should a secondary actor, one who did
not kill, but who was a member of a terrorist conspiracy, be subject to
the death penalty?
This Article examines these questions in the context of the
Zacarias Moussaoui case, the supposed twentieth hijacker,12 who, on
September 11, 2001, had been held in custody for twenty-six days.
This Article thus first deals with criminal liability imposed not on the
actual perpetrators, but on accomplices and co-conspirators,
secondary rather than primary actors. After the facts and allegations
against Moussaoui are set forth, Part I of this Article analyzes the
U.S. law of conspiracy applicable here. Part I1 examines the
constitutional questions posed by imposing a death sentence on
Moussaoui a s a co-conspirator. Part I11 discusses the policy and
international ramifications for the United States if we execute
Moussaoui or a1 Qaeda and Taliban terrorists after trying them either
in civilian courts or by military tribunals.

A. Facts a n d Allegations against Zacarias Moussaoui
Zacarias Moussaoui was indicted on December 11, 2001, by the
Grand Jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia for conspiring to carry out the September 11 attacks.13
Acting a s his own attorney, he attempted to plead guilty on July 18
and July 25, 2002.14 After the Court's questioning apparently made
him realize he was unwilling to admit to the charges, he withdrew his

11.
See, e.g., Nora Demleitner, The Death Penalty i n the United States:
Following the European Lead? 81 OR. L. REV. 131,143-44(2002).
12.
Some federal officials are now saying, however, that they no longer think
that Moussaoui was in fact the twentieth hijacker. See Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen,
A1 Qaeda Effort to Enter U.S. i n August 2001, WASH. POST,Nov. 6,2003,at Al,A23.
13.
Indictment, United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A(E.D. V a .
Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Ol-cr-O04551
DocketSheet.htm1. The indictment charged h i m with the following offenses: (1)
conspiracy to commit acts o f terrorism transcending national boundaries; (2)conspiracy
t o commit aircraft piracy; (3) conspiracy to destroy aircraft; (4) conspiracy to use
weapons of mass destruction; (5) conspiracy t o murder U.S. employees; and (6)
conspiracy to destroy property. Id.; see also David Johnston & Philip Shenon, A Nation
Challenged: The Government's Case: Man Held Since August Is Charged With Role i n
the September 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 12,2001,at Al.
14.
Philip Shenon, Terror Suspect Changes Mind on Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26,2002,at Al.
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guilty plea.16 The Justice Department is seeking the death penalty in
his case.16
Zacarias Moussaoui was born in France of Moroccan parents on
May 30, 1968.17 He obtained a masters degree from Southbank
University in Great Britain.ls He was living in London before coming
to the United States on February 23, 2001.19 The indictment alleges
that in April 1998, Moussaoui "was present a t the a1 Qaeda-affiliated
Khalden Camp in A f g h a n i ~ t a n . " ~ ~
Upon arriving in the United States, Moussaoui allegedly
declared having a t least $35,000 in cash to U.S. Customs. Three days
later, he opened a bank account in Norman, Oklahoma and deposited
"approximately $32,000 [in] cash."21 For the next four months he
attended the Airman Flight School in Norman.22
On June 20, 2001, Moussaoui allegedly purchased flight deck
training videos for the Boeing 747 Model 400 and the Boeing 747
Model 200 from "the Ohio Pilot Store."23 Two of the September 11
hijackers had allegedly purchased the same training videos from the
same store, three months earlier.24On July 29 and 30, less than ten

Id.
Department of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Ashcroft, Justice
Department to Seek Death Penalty in Moussaoui Case (Mar. 28, 2002), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2002/ March 102-ag186.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004);
see also Philip Shenon & Neil Lewis, U.S. To Seek Death Penalty for Moussaoui in
Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 28,2002, a t A20.
17.
Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455A, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, fi 13 (E.D. Va. July 2002), available a t http://notablecases.vaed.
uscourts.gov/l:01-cr-00455/docs/66826/0.pdf
(last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
Id.
18.
19.
Id. 77 41-42. After growing up in France, Moussaoui moved to London to
pursue his masters degree and had been living there for seven years. MICHAEL GRIFFIN,
REAPINGTHE WHIRLWIND246-47 (rev. ed. 2003). He was asked to leave the Brixton
Mosque for preaching holy war. Id. a t 247. A French investigative judge suspected one
"Zacarias" as being an Algerian a1 Qaeda paymaster, attempted to interview Moussaoui,
and have his apartment searched, but the British refused. Id.
20.
Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17, 7 13. CBS reported that
Moussaoui traveled to Chechnya in 1997. GRIFFIN, supra note 19, a t 248. He is
reported a s twice visiting in September and October 2003 the Khallad operation center
in Malaysia, the base for the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Id. a t 248. On the second trip
he reportedly stayed with Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain who
supported the Taliban. Id. Sufaat gave him a letter of introduction, stating the
Moussaoui was a marketing executive for Infocus Tech, a computer company, and had
a salary of $2,500 per month. Id.; see also JASON BURKE, AL QAEDA,CASTINGA SHADOW
OF TERROR
206 (2003). Moussaoui then traveled back to London, had a visit from bin
al-Shibh, then traveled to Afghanistan by way of Pakistan and returned to London on
February 7,2001. GRIFFIN,supra note 19, a t 278. After a couple of weeks in London, he
took off for the United States, flying into Chicago and amving in Norman, Oklahoma
on February 26,2001. GRIFFIN,supra note 19, a t 248.
21.
Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17,nq 42-43.
~ d144.
.
22.
23.
~ d1.53.
24.
zd. 1145,53.
15.
16.
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days after purchasing the B-747 training videos, Moussaoui allegedly
made several phone calls from public telephones to a number in
Duesseldorf, Germany.z5 On August 1 and 3, Ramzi bin al-Shibhz6
allegedly wired "approximately $14,000 to Moussaoui, first from
Duesseldorf and then from Hamburg, germ an^.^' Less than two
weeks earlier, Bin al-Shibh allegedly wired money from Germany to
one of the September 11 hijackers in F l ~ r i d a Al-Shibh
.~~
allegedly
shared a n apartment in Germany with Mohamed Atta, said to be the
mastermind of the September 11 attacks.z9
Ten days after receiving the second wire transfer, Moussaoui
started training on Boeing 747 flight simulators a t the Pan Am Flight
Academy in Minneapolis, M i n n e ~ o t a .He
~ ~ paid the Academy the
balance due, $6,800, in cash.31 One of his flight instructors suspected
Moussaoui of terrorism when Moussaoui "repeatedly proved himself
incapable of understanding basic flying techniques but still insisted
on learning how to fly a 747, the largest commercial jet."3z The flight
instructor made repeated calls to the FBI until finally, three days
later, on August 16, 2001, Moussaoui was arrested for immigration
violation^.^^ He allegedly told FBI agents that he was taking flying
lessons for pleasure and never mentioned the September 11 plot.34

25.
Id. 7 63.
26.
Id. 7 64.
27.
Id. 7 65.Apparently, al-Shibh received the money from Mustafa Ahmed alHawsawi, also known as "Sheikh Sayeed," a "known associate of bin Laden." GRIFFIN,
supra note 19,at 251.Ahmed was also apparently at least the conduit if not the source
of the $35,000i n cash Moussaoui brought with him to the United States. Id.
28.
Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17,f 21.
29.
Id. f 14; see also Desmond Butler, Threats and Responses: Intelligence;
Germans Were Tracking Sept. 11 Conspirators as Early as 1998, Documents Disclose,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at A10. Al-Shibh was arrested i n Pakistan the following
year. Desmond Butler, Threats and Responses: Investigations; Germans i n U.S. With
Data On a Top Qaeda Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,2002,at A20 (noting that al-Shibh
was arrested earlier that month, September 2002).
30.
Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17,f 70.
Jim Yardley, Nation Challenged: The Conspiracy Charge; E-Mail Sent to
31.
Flight School Gave Terror Suspect's 'Goal', N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 8,2002,at Al. Moussaoui
had previously paid $1,500.00of the $8,300.00tuition by Visa card. Id.; see also
Indictment, supra note 13,7 72.
32.
Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: the Suspect, Flight School Warned
F.B.I. of Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,2001,at B1;Yardley, supra note 31.
33.
Christopher Drew, After the Attacks: The Plot, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 17, 2001,
at A4.
34.
Government's Response i n Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike
Government's Notice t o Seek the Penalty of Death at 21,United States v. Moussaoui, No.
01-455-A,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13326 (E.D. Va. July 11, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.commdocs/docs/do~~lm0u~~aoui~usmoussaouiO51002gvrspl.pdf
(last visited
Feb. 3,2004). O n August 26,French informed the FBI of Moussaoui's links to a1 Qaeda.
GRIFFIN,
supra note 19,at 256.

Heinonline - - 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l

L.

360 2004

20041

DEA TH PENAL N

361

Moussaoui has been in custody ever since. He had been incarcerated
for twenty-six days when the September 11 attacks occurred.35
After September 11, a n intensified FBI investigation revealed
that he had the telephone number of al-Shibh in Germany.36 In his
various attempts a t confession, Zacarias Moussaoui has admitted in
open court to being a member of a1 Qaeda and being loyal to Osama
bin Laden.3' He might have applauded on seeing the collapse of the
World Trade Center Towers on television while he was in custody.38
He denies, however, being the so-called twentieth hijacker or being
"directly involved with the September 11attacks.39

B. Court Proceedings and Sanctions
Because of Moussaoui's somewhat erratic behaviour the district
court conducted a hearing into his competency to stand trial.40 U.S.
District Court Judge Leonie M. Brinkema ultimately concluded that
Moussaoui was competent to stand trial and to represent himself.41
He did so,42and in the process made damaging admissions, affirming

35.
After Moussaoui's arrest, the 19 hijackers in the words of one commentator
went into "high gear," possibly suggesting that they feared the operation would abort.
Id. at 257.
36.
Coleen Rowley, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent in the Minneapolis
office criticized FBI Headquarters for failing to approve a request to seek a search
warrant of Moussaoui's computer before September 11 or to give credence to a n
Arizona FBI report that together might have warned officials of the September 11
attacks. Dan Eggen & Bill Miller, FBI Flaws Alleged By Field Staff Moussaoui Probe
Lapses Blamed on Headquarters, WASH. POST, May 24,2002, a t Al.
37.
Shenon, supra note 14.
38.
Rick Linsk, Terror Suspect at End of Road, CENTREDAILY.COM,
Sept. 10,
2002, available a t http://www.centredaily.com/mldlcentreda~4038932.htm(last
visited Feb. 5, 2004) (noting that Los Angles Times initially reported jailer said
Moussaoui cheered upon learning of September 11 attacks, but story has since been
contradicted). See Bob Drogin & Josh Meyer, After the Attack; The Investigation, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17,2001, a t A4.
39.
Shenon, supra note 14. He also stated that while he might be a member of
a1 Qaeda, "it doesn't mean I'm on the plane," an apparent reference to the September
11hijacked airliners. Id.
40.
There is evidence of some degree of mental illness in other members of
Moussaoui's family. See Susan Dominus, Everyone Has a Mother, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE,
Feb. 9,2003, a t 37.
41.
Moussaoui told his lawyers that he would refuse to submit to a psychiatric
examination. Transcript of Motion Hearing Before Hon. Leonie M. Brinkema, U.S.
District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia a t 44, United States v.
Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11087 (E.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2002),
available at http://cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-042202.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
42.
Judge Brinkema has subsequently revoked her order that permitted
Moussaoui to represent himself. Order, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, slip
op. (E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 2003), available a t http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Ol-cr00455/docs/69412/0.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). Judge Brinkema stated that she
took this step to bar Moussaoui from representing himself, because of his frivolous
motions and contemptuous language. Id.
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his loyalty to Osama bin Laden, possible knowledge of the September
11 attacks, and apparent close ties to other top a1 Qaeda leaders.43In
addition, Judge Brinkema granted his motion to have access to alShibh, but the government appealed.44The government argued that
Moussaoui does not have the right to a videotaped deposition of alShibh, asserting national security grounds.45 The prosecutor stated,
in oral argument before the Fourth Circuit, that al-Shibh '8uries this
defendant," but whether that means that al-Shibh's alleged
statements to the government implicate Moussaoui in the September
11attacks is unclear.46
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the Justice Department's appeal,
concluding that the district court's requiring the government to
permit a videotaped deposition of a1 Shibh was not a "final order."47
By a vote of seven to five, the Fourth Circuit en banc refused the
Justice Department's request to consider the panel's decision.48The
government initially decided to defy the district court order to
arrange a videotaped deposition of al-Shibh, an order later expanded
to require the same of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu
Z ~ b a y d a h .On
~ ~ September 25, 2003, the government took the
unusual step of joining in the defense motion to dismiss the

43.
Moussaoui has admitted being loyal to Osama bin Laden. Philip Shenon,
Threats and Responses: The Courts; Justice Dept. Warns of Risk to Prosecution and
Security, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at A21. In court papers, he wrote, " I will be
delighted t o come back one day to blow myself into your new W.T.C. i f ever you rebuild
it." Philip Shenon, A Nation At W a c The Terrorist Suspect; Man Charged i n Sept. I I
Attacks Demands That Qaeda Leaders Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at B12. He
also referred t o Mohammed Shaikh Khalid, whom U.S. and Pakistani forces captured
i n Pakistan as ' T o p Mujahid Brother Mohammed" and called another of the captured
a1 Qaeda leaders, Abu Zubaydah, " F l ] ycommander Zubaydah." Id. Mohammed Shaikh
Khalid is reported t o be t h e chairman of a1 Qaeda's military committee and
mastermind of the September 11 attacks. YOSRI FOUDA& NICK FIELDING,
MASTERMINDS
O F TERROR12, 173 (2003). Moussaoui also stated, "I have certain
knowledge about September 11, and I know exactly who done it. I know which group,
who participated, when i t was decided. I have many information." Government's Brief
at 11, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4792 (4th Cir. fded Oct. 31, 2003) (quoting
record at 2JAU223), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaou~
usmouss102403gbrf.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
44.
See Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Prosecutor Fights Ruling, WASH. POST,June
13,2003, at A9.
45.
Id.
46.
Id. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, United States v. Moussaoui, 333
F.3d 509 (4th Cir. June 3, 2003) (Nos. 03-4262, 03-4261). See also Government: A1
Qaeda Witness 'Buries' 9 / 11 Defendant Moussaoui, at http:l/www.cnn.com/2003ILAWI
06/13lmoussaoui.tria1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
47.
See Moussaoui, 333 F.3d at 514.
48.
United States v. Moussaoui, 336 F.3d 279,279 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
49.
Philip Shenon, U.S. Will Defy Court's Order i n Terror Case, N.Y.W E S ,
July 15, 2003, at A l .
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i n d i ~ t m e n tA
. ~district
~
court judgment dismissing the case would be
a "final order," clearing the way for a government appeal to the
Fourth C i r ~ u i t . ~ ~
Rebuking the government, however, Judge Brinkema denied the
motion to dismiss, and sanctioned the government a s follows: (1) the
government may not seek the death penalty, and (2) the government
may not a t trial attempt to tie the defendant to the September 11
attacks.52 The court reasoned, among other things, t h a t the death
penalty requires that a defendant have played a substantial role in
bringing about the death of the victims of September 11 and that the
government's depriving the defendant of witnesses t h a t might show
he played little or no role in those attacks violated his rights under
federal statutory and constitutional law.53 The government is
appealing the Fourth Circuit ruling.54 If the government is ultimately
unsuccessful, it may move the case into a military tribunal.55

50.
Philip Shenon, In Maneuver, U.S. Will Let Terror Charges Drop, N.Y.
TIMES,Sept. 26, 2003, a t Al. The government had hoped that that the district court
would have dismissed and that the Fourth Circuit court would have rejected Judge
Brinkema's conclusion that Moussaoui has a right to a video-taped deposition of the
key a1 Qaeda captives. If the Fourth Circuit affirms the dismissal, however, the Bush
Administration has indicated that they will treat Moussaoui a s an "enemy combatant''
and try him in a military tribunal.
51.
Id.
52.
United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A,
slip op. a t 9-13(E.D. Va. Oct. 2,
2003), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Ol-cr-OO455/docs/69264/O.p~
(last visited Jan. 26, 2004);see also Order, United States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01455-A,282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2003), available at http://notablecases.
vaed.uscourts.govll:01-cr-00455/docs/69267/O.p
(last visited Jan. 26, 2004); Philip
Shenon, Judge Rules Out a Death Penalty for 9 / 1 1 Suspect, N.Y. TIMES,Oct. 3,2003,a t
Al.
53.
Id.
54.
Philip Shenon, U.S. to Appeal Ruling on 9 / 1 1 Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2003, a t A28. The government apparently considered but rejected moving
Moussaoui's case to a military tribunal a t this time. Id.
55.
Id. The Justice Department, however, is concerned that allies may be even
more reluctant to extradite a1 Qaeda suspects if Moussaoui's case is transferred to a
military tribunal. See Philip Shenon, A Nation at War, Terrorism Suspect: Man
Charged in Sept. 11 Attacks Demands that A1 Qaeda Leaders Testify, supra note 43.See
also Desmond Butler, German Judge Orders a Retrial for a 9 / 1 1 Figure, N.Y. TIMES
ABSTRACTS,Mar. 5, 2004, 2004 WL72408997, a t *1 (German appellate court ordering
new trial for Mounir el-Motassadeq, "the only person successfully prosecuted for
involvement in Sept. 11 terrorist attacks," because, inter alia, the United States
refused to permit Bin al-Shibh to testify).
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11. UNDERFEDERAL
LAW,I S MOUSSAOUI
CRIMINALLY
RESPONSIBLE
FOR
CONS PI RING^^ TO COMMITTHE SEPTEMBER
11ATTACKS?
To conspire with another, a n actor must agree that "they or one
or more of them" will commit a criminal offense or that the actor
"agrees to aid such other persons in the planning or commission of
such crime."57 Generally, to be a conspirator, the actor must have the
specific intent to commit the criminal offense.58 Thus, the actor's
mere knowledge t h a t members of a conspiracy may commit a n offense
is not enough; the actor must have a stake in the outcome and have
the purpose t h a t the offense be committed in order to be a member of
the c o n ~ p i r a c yOn
. ~ ~the other hand, once a n actor becomes a member

56.
I am indebted to the following case book authors for their insights and case
selections concerning conspiracy law and doctrine: George E. Dix & M. Michael Sharlot
LAWCASESAND MATERIALS
(4th ed. 2002)l; Professors Sanford H. Kadish &
[CRIMINAL
Stephen J . Schulhofer [CRIMINAL
LAWAND ITS PROCESSES,
CASESAND MATERIALS (7th
LAWCASESAND MATERIALS (3d ed.
ed. 2001)]; Wayne R. LaFave N O D E R N CRIMINAL
2001)l.
MODELPENALCODEjj 5.03(1) (1962).
57.
JOSHUA
DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL
LAW434-35 (3d ed. 2001). In
58.
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
defined the offense of conspiracy a s follows:
(1) that the defendant agreed with at least one other person to commit an
offense; (2) the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the
specific intent to commit the offenses that were the objects of the conspiracy;
and (3) that during the existence of the conspiracy, at least one of the overt acts
set forth in the indictment was committed by one or more of the members of the
conspiracy in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy.
United States v. Salemeh, 152 F.3d 88, 144 (2d Cir. 1998).
See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("A conspirator must
59.
intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a
substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or
facilitating the criminal endeavor."); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994) (citing United States v. Peoni,
100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938), and Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619
(1949)),superseded inpart, 15 U.S.C. jj 7%. Judge Posner noted that:
To infer membership from knowledge would erase the distinction between
conspiring on the one hand, which means joining an agreement, and aiding and
abetting on the other, which means materially assisting a known-to-be-illegal
activity in the hope that it will flourish to the benefit, pecuniary or otherwise,
of the aider.
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 288 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th
Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565,
569-70 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that Learned Hand's formulation for aider and abettor
liability has been generally accepted) (citing Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. 613 (quoting
Peoni); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Falcone, 109
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of the conspiracy, offenses that are reasonably foreseeable and
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy can be imputed to the
actor even if he or she did not necessarily intend to commit or even
know about the offense in question.60
Justice Frankfurter summarized the classic rationales for the
crime of conspiracy:
[Clollective criminal agreement-partnership
in crime-presents
a
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted
action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be
successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals
involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group association
for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the
attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could
accomplish.61

It would have been impossible for a single individual to bring
down the Twin Towers. In combating a criminal organization, be it
the Mafia or a1 Qaeda, traditional conspiracy law and RICO
conspiracy law62 are major weapons in the prosecutor's arsenal.
Given the "greater potential threat" to society posed by a

F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.);Peoni, 100 F.2d a t 402 (Hand, J.); People v.
Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 475 (1967); MODELPENALCODE 5 5.03(1) (1995). For a
lucid discussion of Falcone and the seminal Supreme Court case pointing in the
opposite direction, see Direct Sales Co. u United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709 (1943) and
United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 285-89 (7th Cir. 1992).
60.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). The Pinkerton
doctrine is controversial, however. Although the federal courts have embraced it, the
Model Penal Code and several states have rejected it. See ALA. CODE3 13A-2-23 &
Commentary (1999); 720 ILL. COMP.STAT.5 515-2 (1999); N.D. CENT.CODE5 12.1-03Ol(c) (1999); State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184, 187-89 (Wis. 2001); Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d
1147, 1148 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Small, 272 S.E.2d 128, 135 (N.C. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 206 N.E.2d 672, 680 (Mass. 1965); MODELPENAL CODE,
5 2.06 cmt. 6(a) (1985); Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the
Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM.L. REV. 1122, 1151 (1975); infra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text.
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.)
61.
Cjustifying the double criminality aspect of conspiracy that permits punishing a
defendant both for the completed target offense and for the conspiracy to commit the
target offense). But see Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law, 1 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J . 1, "3 n.12 (1992) (citing Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the
United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414 (1959) (stating that none of Frankfurter's
rationales have been empirically demonstrated)). The Model Penal Code and some
states have rejected this double criminality aspect of conspiracy law. See MODEL PENAL
CODE 5 1.07(1)@) (1962). But see Neal Kumar Kaytal, Why it Makes Sense to Have
Harsh Punishments for Conspiracy, LEGAL AFF., Apr. 2003, a t 44 (advocating Pinkerton
as necessary weapon against dangers of group activity and as means to compel
cooperation of minor actors). Although most often used against defendants who have
completed the target offense, the crime of conspiracy is also employed to stop criminal
activity a t the early planning stages long before criminal liability for attempt or for the
target offense attaches. Marcus, supra.
62.
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
$5 1962-68 (1970).

Heinonline - - 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.

365 2004

366

VANDERB/LTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W

/VOL. 3Z353

sophisticated terrorist group like a1 Qaeda, federal prosecutors (and
military tribunals) will almost certainly and routinely resort to
conspiracy law when prosecuting such 0ffende1-s.~~
Conspiracy doctrine is vague and can be adapted to the needs of
. ~ ~ conspiracy can be defined broadly or narrowly.
the p r o ~ e c u t o r The
For example, the conspiracy could be defined narrowly as the
nineteen hijackers and others bereinafter the "in-group
conspirators"], who worked with them and who specifically intended65
to hijack the four civilian airliners and to crash them into the Twin
Or the conspiracy
Towers, the Pentagon, and possibly Capitol
could be defined broadly to include those who joined a1 Qaeda and
who follow Osama bin Laden's f ~ t w a h , ~authorizing
'
the killing of

63.
Conspiracy is certainly a n appropriate tool when dealing with an
organization like a1 Qaeda. See Marcus, supra note 61, at 42.
64.
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The conspiratorial agreement need not be formally proven. Iannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1975) (Powell, J.) ("The agreement need not be
shown to have been explicit. It can instead be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of the case.").
65.
If the cell system deliberately kept conspirators in the dark about the
details of the conspiracy, the "willful blindness" doctrine might be invoked to satisfy at
least a 'lmowingly" mens rea. See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
66.
Apparently, the White House was rejected as a target for "navigational
reasons"; the capitol building was much larger and easier to target. FOUDA & FIELDING,
supra note 43, a t 127-28.
67.
The fatwah issued by Osama bin Laden and the leaders of Jihad groups in
Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh states a s follows:
[T]o kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual
duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, until
the Aqsa mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Haram mosque [in Mecca] are freed
from their grip, and until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart
from all the lands of Islam, incapable of threatening any Muslim.
BERNARD
LEWIS, THECRISISOF ISLAM
xxiv-xxvii (2003) (quoting the 1998 fatwah issued
by Osama bin Laden and other fundamentalist leaders) (emphasis added); see also Abbas
Amanat, Empowered through Violence: The Re-inventing of Islamic Extremism, in THE
AGE OF TERROR43 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001) (noting that in 1996
when Osama bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan he issued a fatwah, calling "upon all
Muslims to kill Americans as a religious duty"). For a good summary on Osama bin
Laden and al Qaeda, see Pierre Conesa, Background to Washington's War on Terror: A1
Qaida, The Sect, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 2002, available at
http://mondedip1o.com/2002/01/07sect?vars+zacarias+moussaoui (last visited Feb. 4,
2004). See also Al-Qa'ida (the Base), available at http://www.ict.org.il/inter-terl
orgdet.cfm?orgid=74 (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). A "fatwah" is defined a s "a generic term
for any legal decision made by a Mufti [an Islamic judge] or other Islamic religious
authority, but, because of the particular context in which the West became familiar with
the word, it is sometimes erroneously thought to mean 'death sentence."' Nadine
Gordimer, A Letter, with Love, to Salman Rushdie, THE TORONTO STAR,Feb. 14, 1992, at
A23, available at 1992 WL 6525312 (quoting THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NEW WORDS);
see also FOUDA& FIELDING,
supra note 43, a t 9 (defining fatwah as "religious decree").
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Americans, civilians and military alike.68 Even if this class of
conspirators hereinafter the "out-group conspirators"] knew nothing
of the September 11 attacks beforehand, such attacks were arguably
reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of this
conspiracy to kill Americans. Thus under the Pinkerton doctrine,69
this broader class might likewise be criminally responsible for
conspiring to carry out the attacks.
Moussaoui has admitted to being a member of a1 Qaeda. He also
engaged in a series of activities that parallel those of the nineteen
hijackers. Some reports indicate that al-Shibh, who provided
logistical support and money to the hijackers, has asserted to
government interrogators that Moussaoui was going to be used only
as a backup.70 If Moussaoui knew he was serving as a backup, a
stand-in if something happened to one of the other hijackers, then
Moussaoui could be criminally liable not only a s a conspirator but a s
a n accomplice in that he would have agreed to commit the target
offenses and, assuming he agreed to be available if needed, he would
have encouraged and thus aided and abetted the nineteen hijackers
and others involved in the c ~ n s p i r a c y .If~ ~none of the nineteen
hijackers were aware of Moussaoui's alleged willingness to serve as a
backup, then a t common law, Moussaoui may not be deemed to be a n
aider and abettor.72 Under this factual scenario, he would still,
however, be part of the in-group conspiracy.
Moussaoui claims, however, that he had nothing to do with the
September 11 attacks. Moussaoui's standby attorneys filed a motion,
asserting that al-Shibh would characterize Moussaoui a s "'a
problematic and unstable hanger-on who could never be trusted to be

68.
The Justice Department apparently is adopting a broader theory o f
conspiracy, for the prosecutor argued before the Fourth Circuit as follows: 'There is no
suggestion i n the indictment that everything was directed at September 11 . . . and
once September 11 passed, the conspiracy dissolved and everybody went home and
they satisfied their obligations. This was an ongoing conspiracy . . . for years that
involved killing Americans." See Transcript o f Oral Argument at 23, United States v.
Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. June 3, 2003) (Nos. 03-4262, 03-4261); Government:
A1 Qaeda Witness 'Buries'9/11 Defendant Moussaoui, supra note 46.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946);see supra notes 50-68
69.
and infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
70.
Jeffrey Markon, Moussaoui Defense Claims He Was Supposed to Help i n
Later Action by a1 Qaeda, ASIANWALLST. J., May 15, 2003, at A8.
I f Moussaoui were deliberately kept i n the dark about his possible role, the
71.
doctrine of willful blindness might be employed t o establish that he acted "knowingly."
See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALLAW 516 (2003) ("An
72.
undisclosed intention t o render aid if needed will not suffice, for i t cannot encourage
the principal i n his commission o f the crime."). But see MODEL PENALCODE
$ 2.06(3)(a)(ii)(1962) (including "attempts t o aid" as sufficient to satisfy actus reus for
complicity).
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a participant in any significant undertaking by a1 Qaeda."'73 Based on
this motion, the district court concluded that Moussaoui "has made a
significant showing that [text omitted by the court] . . . would be able
to provide material, favorable testimony on the defendant's behalf."74
If Moussaoui was not a part of the September 11 in-group
conspiracy, he could, however, be found guilty of conspiring as part of
the larger out-group conspiracy. He has admitted to being a member of
a1 Qaeda and now claims that he was training for a different mission.75
He also admitted being loyal to Osama bin Laden.76 He thus
presumably shares Osama bin Laden's objective that U.S. civilians as
well as military personnel be killed.77 Even if he did not know of the
September 11 attacks beforehand, he could arguably be found guilty
under a Pinkerton rationale, namely, that those attacks were
reasonably foreseeable and carried out in furtherance of the a1 Qaeda
conspiracy to kill A m e r i c a n ~ . ~ ~
Imposing criminal liability for the September 11 attacks under
this latter theory is troubling, however. Traditionally under AngloSaxon jurisprudence a n individual is criminally responsible only for
crimes the individual has personally committed, has aided and
abetted, or has conspired to commit.79 A1 Qaeda is estimated to have
had from 4,000 to 10,000 members a s of September 11, 2001.80
Taking Pinkerton to its logical conclusion supports imposing liability
on any then active members of a1 Qaeda for the crimes of September
11 even if these members never agreed to, participated in, or knew of
73.
Terrorist Attack Aftermath: U.S. Appeal in Moussaoui Case Dismissed,
FACTSON FILE WORLDNEWS DIGEST,June 26, 2003, at 521B3, available i n LEXIS,
News Group File.
United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A,2003 WL 21263699, at *4
74.
(E.D. V a . Mar. 10,2003). The redacted text presumably refers t o Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
75.
Markon, supra note 70,at A8.
76.
See supra note 43.
See LEWIS,supra note 67 and accompanying text (setting forth the fatwah
77.
issued by Osama bin Laden).
Presumably, even as only a member of the out-group conspiracy, Moussaoui
78.
would be aware of the other previous, alleged a1 Qaeda attacks. See infra notes 145-46
and accompanying text.
"But i t is repugnant to our system of jurisprudence, where guilt is generally
79.
personal to the defendant . . . to impose punishment, not for the socially harmful
agreement t o which the defendant is a party, but for substantive offenses i n which he
did not participate." KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, at 693 (quoting People v.
McGee, 399 N.E.2d 177, 181-82(N.Y. 1979)) (emphasis added).
See Political Islam and the United States, a Winding Road to War, Oct. 3,
80.
2002, available at http://www.Northadams.com/advocate/story7825.html (last visited
Feb. 4, 2004). The FBI estimates that 15,000 people received training at a1 Qaeda's
camps i n Afghanistan, but not all of them joined a1 Qaeda. See Noam Scheiber, The
Way We Live Now: 2-16-03: Number i n the News, N.Y. TIMESMAG., Feb. 16, 2003, at
12. But see BURKE,supra note 20,at 13 (stating that as o f September 11,a1 Qaeda had
about 100 "hard core" members used to train and organize those who came to Afghan
camps and who inspired others from other allied fundamentalist Islamic groups).
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the attacks and did nothing, other than join a1 Qaeda, to further
them. Although some lower federal courts have suggested that the
Pinkerton rule should not be imposed on minor actors in a
c o n ~ p i r a c y , ~the
~ U.S. Supreme Court has never so held.
Furthermore, those courts have not come up with any clear
distinction between minor and major actors.
Some have defended Pinkerton on the ground that it increases
the risk of joining any c o n s p i r a ~ y Furthermore,
.~~
Pinkerton, a t least
theoretically, encourages conspirators to keep a n eye on each other:
"Pinkerton forces conspirators to monitor each other, which in turn
begets suspicion and thus even more m o n i t ~ r i n g . " ~ ~ a s Pinkerton
tly,
has been defended a s a n important weapon against complex criminal
organizations:
[Tlhe ever-increasing sophistication of organized crime presents a
compelling reason against abandonment of Pinkerton . . . . Empirical
evidence has repeatedly demonstrated that those who form and control

81.

See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 851 n.27 ( l l t h Cir. 1985).

Although our decision today extends the Pinkerton doctrine to cases involving
reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended substantive crimes, . . . [olur
holding is limited to conspirators who played more than a 'minor' role in the
conspiracy, or who had actual knowledge of at least some of the circumstances
and events culminating in the reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended
substantive crime.
Id. (emphasis added). The Aluarez court also identified two kinds of Pinkerton cases:
first where the substantive crime is also
one of the primary goals of the alleged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v.
Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1545 n.4 ( l l t h Cir. 1983) (involving conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute marijuana; substantive crime of possession
of marijuana); United States v. Harris, 713 F.2d 623, 626 ( l l t h Cir. 1983)
(involving conspiracy to distribute cocaine; substantive crimes of possession
and distribution of cocaine); United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 309 (5th Cir.
1980) (involving conspiracy to commit mail fraud; substantive crime of mail
fraud).
Aluarez, 755 F.2d a t 850 n.24. The second kind of Pinkerton case is where the
substantive crime is
not a primary goal of the alleged conspiracy, but directly facilitates the
achievement of one of the primary goals. See, e.g., Shockley v. United States,
166 F.2d 704, 715 (9th Cir. 194) (involving conspiracy to escape by violent
means from federal penitentiary; substantive crime of first degree murder of
prison guard), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 850 (1948); United States v. Brant, 448 F.
Supp. 781, 782 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (involving narcotics conspiracy; substantive
crime of possession of firearm during commission of felony).
Aluarez, 755 F.2d a t 850 n.24. The Aluarez court asserted that Pinkerton liability is
appropriate in either category "because the substantive crime is squarely within the
intended scope of the conspiracy." Id. Here, the September 11 attacks are presumably
"one of the primary goals" of a1 Qaeda and thus within "the scope of the conspiracy."
See, e.g., Kaytal, supra note 61, a t 44.
82.
83.
Id.
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illegal enterprises are generally well insulated from prosecutions, with
the exception of prosecutions predicated upon the theory of conspiracy.
To preclude uniformly their exposure to additional sanctions,
regardless of the circumstances, for the very crimes which sustain their
illegal ventures, would have the most unfortunate and inequitable

consequence^.^^

The "ever increasing sophistication" of terrorists threatens public
safety far more than organized crime. Consequently, given the
dangers that a large organization such as a1 Qaeda presents to
civilians and civilian objects in our open society, there is arguably all
the more reason to retain, if not expand, the Pinkerton doctrine.
As one prominent defense attorney stated, however:
[ q h e Pinkerton doctrine permits the government to hold a defendant
criminally responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of coconspirators regardless of actual knowledge, intent or participation.
Thus, if the government cannot prove a defendant's guilt [ofl various
substantive charges, it need only convince the jury of the defendant's
guilt of conspiracy to secure convictions on the otherwise unsupportable
substantive charges.85

The drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected Pinkerton, explaining
that "there appears to be no better way to confine within reasonable
limits the scope of liability to which conspiracy may theoretically give
rise."86 Pinkerton has been applied broadly, but its application to
conspiracies a s large as a1 Qaeda appears unprecedented. As one
noted commentator put it, "Such [Pinkerton] liability might be
justified for those a t the top directing and controlling the entire
operation, but i t is clearly inappropriate to visit the same results
upon the lesser participants in the c~nspiracy."~'
The crimes of September 11 are the worst ever committed on
U.S. soil. The principle of retribution and just desert cries out for
severe punishment for those responsible. On the other hand, a1 Qaeda
is apparently a loose network of extremist Islamic organization^.^^ To
make every individual associated with that network criminally
responsible for the heinous crimes of September 11 would go too far,
straining the very principle set forth above.89 Even without

See KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, a t 692 (quoting Peter Buscemi,
84.
Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1122, 1152-53 (1975) (quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kenney)).
85.
See Paul Marcus, supra note 61, at 7 (quoting Jeffrey Weiner, President of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
MODELPENALCODE 5 2.06 cmt. 6(a) (1962).
86.
LAFAVE,supra note 72, at 527.
87.
See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
88.
But see United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998). That case
89.
arose out of the trial of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. Two of the defendants
there argued that there was insufficient evidence to show that they had agreed to
commit the bombing. They also asserted that Pinkerton was being used without
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considering Pinkerton liability, such individuals would, however, be
subject to significant terms of i m p r i s ~ n m e n t . ~ ~

111. CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF IMPOSING THE DEATHPENALTY ON
ACCOMPLICES
AND CONSPIRATORS

If Moussaoui were found guilty of conspiring to hijack airplanes
and to crash them into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, would
~ ~ U.S.
sentencing him to death violate the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n ? The

sufficient evidence that they were members of the underlying conspiracy. T h e Second
Circuit rejected these arguments, noting first that the evidence supported that two
defendants conspired to bomb buildings and vehicles i n the United States. T h e
government did not have to show that the defendants agreed to bomb t h e World Trade
Center: ' T h e government is not required to demonstrate that the defendant agreed to
all of the conspiracy's objectives, as long as the defendant shared 'some knowledge of
the [conspiracy's] unlawful aims and objectives."' Id. at 147 (citations omitted). As
members of t h e general conspiracy to bomb buildings and vehicles i n t h e United States,
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find them guilty of the bombing under a
Pinkerton rationale. Id. at 147-48. The government i n the Moussaoui case could make
the identical argument. Even i f Moussaoui knew nothing about the September 11
attacks or did nothing to further them, his conduct here that so parallels t h a t o f the
September 11 hijackers could be considered part of a general conspiracy t o bomb
buildings using airliners as missiles. A jury could then find h i m guilty o f conspiring to
carry out the attacks under a Pinkerton rationale.
Cf. Position o f t h e Government W i t h Respect to Sentencing Factors and
90.
Government's Sentencing Memorandum, United States v . Lindh, No. 02-37A, 227 F.
Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. V a . Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh92602psentmem.pdf(last visited June 30, 2003) (defendant
pleaded guilty t o aiding terrorist organization and other crimes and received 20-year
sentence).
A preliminary issue that the parties have already litigated before trial is
91.
whether defendant Moussaoui, assuming he is found guilty o f one or more capital
offenses,is death eligible under t h e Federal Death Penalty Act o f 1994. As a threshold
matter, the Act requires that t h e government prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant:
( A ) intentionally killed t h e victim;

(B)

intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted i n t h e death of
the victim;

(C)

intentionally participated i n a n &, contemplating that the life of a person
would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used i n connection
with a person, other than one of the participants i n the offense, and the
victim died as a direct result of the act; or

(D) intentionally and specifically engaged i n an'act o f violence, knowing that
the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one o f the
participants i n the offense, such that participation i n the act constituted a
reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a direct result of
the act[.]
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Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment is not
locked into the mores of the eighteenth century when the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written. The Court considers
the "evolving standards of decency of a maturing society" to
determine the Eighth Amendment's reach.92 Eschewing a subjective
approach, the Court has adopted a majoritarian one to identify the
current "evolving standards." Examining so-called "objective factors
to the maximum possible extent," the Court first reviews the
enactments of Congress and the state legislatures and then
prosecutorial decisions and jury verdicts.93 The Court also considers
the extent to which the punishment comports with the principles of
deterrence and retributive justice.94

18 U.S.C.A. $ 3591(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). Aside from these threshold
requirements, the government must satisfy the jury that at least one aggravating
factor exists and outweighs any mitigating factors. See id.; 18 U.S.C.A. $ 3592 (1994).
Since defendant Moussaoui was in custody on September 11, he neither
"intentionally killed nor "intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury." Thus neither
(A) nor (B) apply. The government contends, however, that defendant Moussaoui is
death eligible under provisions (C) and (D). This argument depends on reading "act" a s
including "conspiracy." The government argues that the agreement is the actus reus of
conspiracy and thus the offense of conspiracy should be considered tantamount to a n
"act" for purposes of the statute. The defense argues that act is not synonymous with
offense and that an agreement to commit a crime alone fails to satisfy the act
requirement. At least one Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that Congress
drafted these two subsections to codify the Supreme Court's holdings in Enmund v.
Florida and Tison u. Arizona, the major, relevant Eighth Amendment cases analyzed in
detail below. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 792 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987).
[Slection 3591(a) does not set forth a list of aggravating factors, but, on the
contrary, serves a gatekeeping function. Section 3591(a) codifies the command
in Enmund, 458 U.S. a t 797, and Tison, 481 U.S. at 157, to limit the imposition
of the death penalty to those murderers who both undertake felony
participation and demonstrate at least reckless indifference to human life.
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 355 (5th Cir. 1998). A full discussion of the
statutory issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Discussion is focused on the closely
related question as to whether a death sentence under this statute passes
constitutional muster.
92.
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910); see also Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1958).
93.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). In Atkins, the Court
recognized the primacy of objective evidence, such as legislative enactments and jury
verdicts, in determining "evolving standards of decency." Id. The Atkins court, however,
noted that ultimately the responsibility for interpreting the Eighth Amendment was
the Court's and it could bring to bear its subjective judgment. Id. a t 313. The Court
applies a somewhat different proportionality review to non-capital cases. See, e.g.,
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (upholding against constitutional attack life
sentence under three strikes statute for defendant whose last strike was shoplifting
three golf clubs).
Atkins, 536 U.S. a t 318-19 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183(1976)
94.
and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
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Since constitutionally reviving the death penalty in Gregg v.
Georgiag5in 1976, the Supreme Court has narrowed the instances in
which an accomplice or co-conspirator to a capital crime may be put to
death. Ruling in two felony murder cases,96 the Court has required
that the Government show at least that the secondary actor was a
"major particip[antIH in the underlying felony and that he or she
intended to kill or exhibited a reckless indifference to human life.97In
the first case, Enmund v. Florida,98 the defendant was a getaway
driver, but there was some evidence that he planned the robbery. He
and his two co-defendants stopped at a farmhouse so they could rob
the occupants, an elderly couple. Upon hearing her eighty-six-yearold husband shout out, his seventy-four-year-old wife got their
shotgun and shot one of the co-defendants in the arm. They, in turn,
shot and killed both the husband and the wife. Enmund was a few
hundred feet away, waiting by the car, but was charged with felony
murder, convicted, and sentenced to death.
Reversing the death sentence, the Supreme Court held that the
actor must have intended to kill and have played a major role in the
killing.99 In Enmund, the Court noted that only eight jurisdictions
permitted death sentences for accomplices to felony murder, and all
but three required such a defendant to be shown to have a culpable
mental state.loOThe Court then held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited executing an actor "who aids and abets a felony in the
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not
himself kill, attempt to kill or intend that a killing take place or that
lethal force will be employed."lo1

95.
Gregg, 428 U.S. a t 176. In Gregg, the Court concluded that the guided jury
discretion death penalty statute there passed constitutional muster, thus approving
the reinstatement of the death penalty after, in effect, declaring all death penalty
statutes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Gregg, 428 U.S.
a t 169.
96.
Enmund, 458 U.S. 802 (5 to 4); Tison, 481 U.S. a t 157 (5 to 4).
97.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 157. The composition of the Court has changed since
Tison, apparently moving in a more pro-death penalty direction. In Tison, Justice
O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, White and Powell joined. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Stevens joined parts I to
IV-A of Justice Brennan's dissent. Since Tison, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Thomas,
Breyer, and Kennedy have replaced retiring Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
White, and Powell. The first three of these retiring justices expressly found the death
penalty to be unconstitutional in all cases. None of their replacements and no current
member of the Supreme Court have reached that conclusion.
98.
See Enmund, 458 U.S. a t 782.
99.
Id. a t 797.
100. Id. a t 789-91.
101. Id. a t 797, 798. One commentator has noted that the decision could be
interpreted to have set forth a still vaguer standard. See David McCord, State Death
Sentencing for Felony Murder Accomplices Under the Enmund a n d Tison Standards, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 850-51 (2000) (criticizing Court for also stating that culpable mental
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Writing for the four dissenters, Justice 0'Connorlo2 argued that
the Court had miscounted the number of states that authorize
imposing capital punishment on accomplices to felony murderers.lo3
She also read the Florida Supreme Court decision, upholding the
death penalty, as leaving undisturbed the trial court's finding that
defendant did not play a minor role.lo4 She argued that contemporary
standards reflected in jury determinations and legislative enactments
did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty for accomplice
felony murder or that such a sentence would be disprop~rtionate.'~~
Five years later in Tison v. Arizona,lo6 the Court upheld the
death penalty imposed on two sons whose father (and his cellmate)
actually carried out the killings.lo7 In that case, their .father was
serving a life sentence for murdering a prison guard in a previous
escape attempt. Bringing to the prison a n arsenal of guns hidden in
an ice chest, the Tison sons helped their father escape once again
(along with his cellmate, another convicted murderer). After the car
in which they were fleeing broke down, one of the sons flagged down
the car of a family. While both sons were some distance away, the
father and his cellmate killed all four members of the family,
including a two-year old. The sons' father later perished in the desert.
The Tison sons were charged with felony murder, convicted, and
sentenced to death.los
The two sons argued that under Enmund the state had to show
that they intended to kill the family members. The Arizona Supreme
Court claimed that the Tison sons had intended to do so, but its
language indicated that that court had concluded that the sons only
foresaw that the death of innocents was probable.log Now writing for
the five-member majority, Justice O'Connor limited Enmund,
reasoning that the sons' reckless indifference in helping their father,

state of actor includes his "anticipat[ing] that lethal force would be used"). This phrase
could be construed to mean a culpable mental state of "recklessly" rather than
"intentionally." Id.
102. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent.
103. Justice O'Connor wrote that "23 States permit a sentencer to impose the
death penalty even though the felony murderer has neither killed nor intended to kill
his victim." Enmund, 458 U.S. a t 822 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens.
104. Id. a t 809 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. a t 826-27. Given the conflicting findings of the trial court and the
Florida Supreme Court, and the revised standards established by the U.S. Supreme
Court, she would have, however, remanded for a new sentencing hearing to determine
whether all the facts in that case warranted the death penalty. Id. at 827.
106. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1987).
107. Id. a t 158.
108. The cellmate was also sentenced to death. Id.
109. Id. a t 142-43.
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whom they knew to be capable of murder, satisfied the Eighth
Amendment.llo The two Tison sons, who were "major" participants in
the underlying felony,lll stood in contrast to Enmund whose "own
participation in the felony murder was so attenuated and since there
was no proof that Enmund had any culpable mental state, the death
penalty was excessive retribution for his crimes."l12 Affirming the
Tisons' death sentences, the Court then held that "major participation
in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to
human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability
requirement."l13
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Brennan114 observed that the
majority failed to follow Enmund.l15 As in Enmund, no evidence in
Tison suggested that the Tison sons intended to cause the death of
the victims. The dissent noted that the father's killing the family was
"spontaneous" while the sons were some distance away fetching water
for the family members.l16 The majority stressed that the sons did
nothing to stop the killing, but there was evidence suggesting that
the sons could not do anything a t that point.l17 The dissent also
criticized the majority for offering examples of arguably unintentional
killings such as "the
who tortures . . . the robber who shoots
someone" not caring in either case whether the victim lives or dies.l18
The problem with these examples is t h a t they focus on the primary
party, the actor who kills or tortures. There, the Tison sons did not
kill anyone; their father did.llg Lastly, in counting the number of
110. Id. a t 151-53.
111. Id.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (citations omitted).
112.
Tison, 481 U.S. a t 158. In Tison, however, the majority also noted that
113.
reckless indifference may rise to the moral equivalence of intentional wrongdoing:
[Slome nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and
inhumane of all-the person who tortures another not caring whether the
victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the
robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the
unintended consequence of killing the victim a s well a s taking the victim's
property. This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit
a s shocking to the moral sense a s an "intent to kill."
Id. a t 157. On the other hand, if the defendant orders another to kill, the defendant has
the intent to kill and satisfies Enmund-Tison regardless of the degree of actual
participation in the killing. See Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468, 478-79 (Miss. 1984).
114. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion. Tison, 481 U.S. a t 159.
115. Id. a t 162-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. a t 165-66.
117. Id. a t 166 n.6.
118. Id. a t 169 (emphasis in original).
119.
Furthermore, the examples that the majority gives are arguably examples of
intentional killings that have been committed without premeditation or deliberation, the
mens rea required in many states for first-degree murder. Id. at 169 n.9. On the other
hand, the actor who intentionally commits serious bodily harm may do so without an
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states that would permit executing felony murder accomplices who
lack a n intent to kill, the majority failed to take into account those
states that have abolished the death penalty. When one does so, the
dissent noted, approximately three-fifths of U.S. jurisdictions reject
the majority's position.120
The dissent appears to have the stronger argument. If the Tisons
acted with reckless indifference, however, it is hard to argue that
Enmund did not act with reckless indifference also. Granted, carrying
out a prison escape and a kidnapping probably presents a greater risk
of harm to innocent people than does a n armed robbery. However,
Enmund knew his accomplices were armed with deadly weapons.
Embarking on a robbery of a n individual in his rural dwelling is
pregnant with the possibility, if not probability, of violence.
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor concluded in Enmund, that defendant
there was not a minor actor, presumably meaning he was a major
actor in the underlying robbery, a t least for capital sentencing
purpose^.'^'
Enmund did, however, appear to play a lesser role in the robbery
than the Tison sons did in the prison escape and in the kidnapping of
the family. The Tison sons were present a t the murder scene whereas
Enmund, although close by, was not. The Tison sons heard their father
considering what to do with the family. The sons could have attempted
to dissuade him from killing and, later after the shots were fired, could
have tried to render aid to the victims. (At least one of the victims
apparently survived for some time after the shooting.)122 The sons
responded by doing nothing, except fleeing with the killers.

intent to kill. Such an actor has traditionally been considered a second-degree murderer
and thereby exempt from the death penalty. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56,
at 396. Certain felony murderers even after Pennsylvania created degrees of murder in
1794 have been considered subject to the death penalty. See id. (quoting seminal
Pennsylvania murder statute of 1794, which became model murder statute for U.S.
states,
[A111 murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in
wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery or burglary shall be deemed murder in the first degree
[and thereby punishable by death] . . . .") (emphasis added).
State v. Bohlen, 690 S.W.2d 174, 176 @to. Ct. App. 1985).
120.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 175 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121.
See supra note 104.
122.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 141.
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The question is what these rulings123 might foretell about the
current Supreme Court's disposition to uphold a death penalty for
Zacarias Moussaoui, should a jury find him guilty of conspiracy and
sentence him to death.124 The factual allegations in the indictment
show that Moussaoui engaged in many of the same activities that the
actual hijackers did, but which are not greatly incriminating in
themselves. He arrived in this country with $35,000 in cash. He
signed up for flying schools; he purchased flight videos on the
operation of the Boeing 747; he took a commercial flying course in
which he operated Boeing 747 flight simulators. He purchased a knife
(as Atta apparently did). Three pieces of evidence more directly link
Moussaoui to a1 Qaeda and the hijackers: (1) He admitted in open
court to being a member of a1 Qaeda and being loyal to Osama bin
Laden; (2) Moussaoui allegedly received terrorist training in
Afghanistan; and (3) Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged coordinator of
the September 11 attacks, wired Moussaoui money.lZ5
If the government is able to prove all the allegations in the
second superseding indictment, a jury could conclude that Moussaoui
was a member of the "in-group" conspiracy. The parallel conduct that
Moussaoui engaged in goes beyond the merely coincidental. That
evidence plus his admissions and his allegedly receiving funds from

123. See also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986) (noting that Enmund
rule that "a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a
killing take place or that lethal force be used" is "substantive limitation on sentencing"
and may be applied not only by jury, but also by appellate court reviewing case).
124. The Court could certainly refuse to grant certiorari. If the government
ultimately transfers Moussaoui's prosecution to a military tribunal, the Court might
not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459-60,
476-77 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting on separation of powers grounds habeas corpus
petition of U.S. citizen, captured with Taliban in Afghanistan, but later brought to
military base in Virginia where held a s "enemy combatant" without charges, without
trial, and without access to counsel), cert. granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S.
Jan. 9, 2004); A1 Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141-42 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(rejecting habeas corpus claim of "next friends" of Taliban and a1 Qaeda Guantanamo
Bay detainees principally on ground that they were beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003). Moussaoui, however, was
arrested in the United States and is being tried in the United States, so his case might
be distinguishable from Odah and Hamdi should the Supreme Court affirm those
cases.
125.
Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17, 11 29, B1; Governments
Response to Standby Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Rule 11 Considerations, Crim.
No. 01-455-A (2002) a t #13-14, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docsl
moussaoui~usmouss72502grsprll.pdf.Al-Shibh apparently roomed with Mohamed
Atta and wired money to Marwan al-Shehhi, one of the hijackers of United Airlines
Flight 175, which they crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center.
Moussaoui also allegedly lied to FBI agents.when being questioned upon his arrest. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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Ramzi bin-al-Shibh probably meets the minimal sufficiency standard,
if not more, to show he was a member of that conspiracy.126
On the other hand, Moussaoui might not have been a member of
the "in-group" conspiracy (but he was unquestionably a member of
the "out-group" conspiracy). His admissions show he was a member of
a1 Qaeda, but the allegations (even if proved to be true) in the second
superseding indictment do not overwhelmingly demonstrate that he
was a member of the in-group conspiracy. The indictment does not
allege that he was the twentieth hijacker. He might have been
training for another operation.12' So far, despite his admissions,
Moussaoui claims he had nothing to do with the September 11
attacks: "I was not directly involved with these people," Moussaoui
told the district court.12s He apparently does not want to die a
martyr's death by poison injection.lZ9
Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has yet to deal with the
question of imposing the death penalty on a n actor indicted for
conspiracy only, not for carrying out the underlying offense or for
being present a t the time of the killings or for ordering the killings or
for playing a major role in them.130 The two felony-murder
126.
If admitted and found credible al-Shibh's alleged statements that
Moussaoui was to serve as a "back-up," would, a s indicated earlier, probably make him
an accomplice and certainly a member of the in-group conspiracy. See supra notes 7072 and accompanying text. The Government apparently is not going to use al-Shibh as
a witness.
See David Johnston & Philip Shenon, Evidence Against Suspect from 9 / 1 1
127.
Is Called Weak, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at A8 (some investigators speculating that
he may have been training for different operation, such as using crop dusters to spray
chemical or biological weapons). Moussaoui himself now claims that he was training for
another operation outside the United States. See Markon, supra note 70.
128.
Shenon, supra note 14.
129.
Id. Even if Moussaoui were involved with the "in-group conspiracy" say a s a
back-up, he might not have known about his designated role. Bin Laden claimed that
al-Qaeda kept the September 11 conspirators in the dark about the operation until the
last minute: " ~ o u s s a o u i ' sand Hani Hanjour's] isolation [from the 'operational axis']
may have been designed to insulate them in the event that the Hollywood and San
Diego cells were destroyed and they were needed to replace the protagonists on short
notice." GRIFFIN,supra note 19, at 253.
130.
The instructions define conspiracy a s follows:
What the Government must prove is that the defendant, Terry Lynn Nichols,
and a t least one other person, did knowingly and deliberately arrive a t some
type of a n agreement that they, and perhaps others, would use a weapon of
mass destruction against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City and the persons in it by means of some common plan or course of action a s
alleged in Count One of the indictment. Proof of such a common understanding
and deliberate agreement among two or more persons, including the defendant
now on trial, is the key element of the charge of criminal conspiracy.
Mere presence a t the scene o f . . . an alleged transaction or event, or mere
similarity of conduct among various persons and the fact that they may have
associated with each other and may have assembled together and discussed
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accomplice cases that the Court has ruled on do suggest, however,
how the Court might rule in Moussaoui's case, should it grant
certiorari.
A. The In-Group Conspirator Who Knew about the September 11
Attacks a n d Played a Major Role in the Conspiracy

If the evidence shows that Moussaoui directly participated in the
September 11 conspiracy, he would be death-eligible under current
constitutional interpretation.131 Assume hypothetically that A, a n a1
Qaeda member, had purchased the airplane tickets for one or more of
the hijackers and had known about the plan to hijack and crash the
airliners. A would thus have intended to commit, among other crimes,
~
that, like Moussaoui, A was not present a t
mass m ~ r d e r . l 3Assume
the murder scene, a n important distinction between the Tisons and
E n m ~ n d .Yet,
l ~ ~those cases dealt with imposing the death penalty on
common aims or interests, do not necessarily establish proof of the existence of
a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who
happens-happens to act in a way which advances some object or purpose of
the conspiracy does not thereby become a conspirator.
But a person may join in an agreement or understanding, a s required for
conviction, without knowing- all the details of the agreement
or understanding,
and without knowing who all the members are. Further, it is not necessary that
a person agree to play any particular part in carrying out the agreement or
understanding. A person may become a member of a conspiracy even if that
person agrees to play only a minor part in the conspiracy, as long a s that
person has an understanding of the unlawful nature of the plan and voluntarily
and intentionally participates in it as something he wants to bring about.
Court TV Casefiles, The Oklahoma City Bombing Trial Transcripts, Terry Nichols, Dec.
16, 1997, http://www.courttv.com/a1~hive/casefiles/oHahomd~chtranscriptdl2l6pm.
html (last visited June 24,2003).
131. He would thus have intended that innocents be killed and would have
actively participated in causing such a result, thereby satisfying Enmund, not to mention
Tison. But see Defendant's Reply to Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Strike Government's Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death, United
States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A, at *3 n.2, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (E.D. Va. May
10, 2003) (arguing that more would be required for death penalty under Enmund-Tison),
available a t http://news.findlaw.co~d~sId~s/moussaousmouss51502dthpopp.pdf.
See Indictment, supra note 13, setting forth the crimes Moussaoui has been
132.
charged with. Presumably for federal jurisdictional reasons, he is not charged with
conspiring to murder all the victims, only U.S. employees who were killed in the
attacks. He is charged, however, with conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction.
Id. The ticket hypothetical was suggested by the defense in papers submitted in reply
to the government's motion in opposition to the defense motion to preclude the death
penalty. See Defendant's Reply to Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Strike Government's Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death, supra note
131 a t *7.
133. Cf. Fairchild v. Norris, 21 F.3d 799, 803-04 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1146 (1995) (concluding that petitioner who, with accomplice, kidnapped and
raped victim was death eligible under Tison even though he was not present when his
accomplice who petitioner knew to be armed killed victim, because petitioner's behavior

Heinonline - - 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l

L.

379 2004

380

VANDERBJL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TJONAL LA W

/VOL. 3Z353

accomplices to felony murder, a n unintentional homicide. Here the
indictment charges that defendant conspired with others to commit
capital crimes t h a t presuppose that the conspirators intended to kill
innocents. The defendant's mens rea would be considerably greater
than the Tisons' (he would have acted intentionally whereas they
acted extremely recklessly), probably making up for the lack of
personal presence a t the scene of the crime. Furthermore, the Tisons
acted extremely recklessly towards a few individuals, mainly prison
guards and four members of the family. A, in this hypothetical,
intended to kill a t least a hundred, if not hundreds of innocent people.
Purchasing the tickets would probably be enough to make him a
"major participant," especially given the magnitude of the intended
loss of life, satisfying both Enmund and T i ~ 0 n . l ~ ~
On the other hand, there appear to be a t least three other
possibilities. Moussaoui might not have directly participated in the
conspiracy, but he might have known about the planned attacks.135
Or he might have participated in the in-group conspiracy, but have
been deliberately kept in the dark about the nature and object of that
conspiracy. Or he might not have known about the planned attacks,
but was here on another operation and thus presumably shared the
general aim of a1 Qaeda that any Americans, including civilians,
should be killed.136 Would imposing the death penalty under any of
these circumstances be constitutional?

constituted "reckless indifference" to human life). But see State v. Carlson, 48 P.3d
1180, 1183 (Ariz. 2002) (reducing sentence from death to life imprisonment without
parole, because, among other reasons, defendant, convicted as co-conspirator, was not
present a t murder and would not necessarily know that killer would carry out murder
in cruel and heinous manner, one of aggravating circumstances for death penalty).
134.
For an excellent discussion of the meaning of "major participant," see
McCord, supra note 101, a t 875-88. A relevant question here is whether being a backup
would render Moussaoui a "major participant." If the other 19 were told or it was
implicitly known that Moussaoui or others would serve as a backup, it might encourage
the 19 to go forward. They would realize that the organization was completely behind
them, and perhaps that their personal honor would be questioned if, for some reason,
they did not or would not complete their mission. If the backup were immediately
available and this availability were also known to one or more of the 19, a backup
might be seen a s playing more than a minor role. On the other hand, if the backup was
not aware of his or her playing any such role and was just engaged in training
activities in the United States, it would be hard to characterize the backup's role a s
major. If the 19 hijackers were unaware of the presence of a backup, then his existence
would not have encouraged them. Under that scenario, the backup would probably not
satisfy the test for accomplice liability, at common law. See supra notes 61-63 and
accompanying text.
See Government's Brief, supra note 43, at *11.
135.
See Amanat, supra note 67, at 43 (explaining that in 1996 when Osama bin
136.
Laden came to Afghanistan he issued a fatwah, "call[ing] upon all Muslims to kill
Americans as a religious duty"); Bin Laden Reportedly Leaves Afghanistan,
Whereabouts Unknown, Feb. 13, 1999, at http://www.cnn.com1WORLDlmeast/9902113/
afghan.binladen/index.html.One of the problems with the law of conspiracy is that it
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B. The Out-Group Conspirator Who Did Not Know about
September 11
Let us deal with the last hypothetical first. Restated, the
question is whether being a member of the "out-group" conspiracy,
perhaps numbering in the hundreds if not thousands, is enough to
permit the death penalty to be imposed absent evidence that the
defendant aided or actively participated in the in-group conspiracy to
carry out the September 11 attacks.13' This first requires a n
examination of the mens rea and later actus reus.
Although research has not revealed another case in which the
Supreme Court relied on the ostrich or willful blindness doctrine138 to
justify the death penalty, the Court might employ this doctrine to
satisfy the culpability requirements for imposing the death penalty
on accessories for murders carried out by others. Assume for a
moment that Moussaoui was in a cell separate from the September 11
hijackers. In organizations like a1 Qaeda, cells are often set up so that
members of one cell do not know members of other cells, and
sometimes members of one cell do not know all the members of the
same
Presumably, cell members are aware of the

does not clearly distinguish between major and minor participants and that the
minnows may be caught in the same net as the sharks and are often subject to severe
punishment. See United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196, 1197 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
bane) (reversing panel decision and reinstating marijuana sale conspiracy conviction of
menial who had merely nodded to undercover agent). See also Marcus, supra note 61,
a t 32 ("Punishment for the completed conspiracy crime has always been stiff."). But see
Kaytal, supra note 61, a t 44.
137.
See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
138. Judge Richard Posner, of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, explained the confusing doctrine of willful blindness:
[Notice] just what is it that real ostriches do (or a t least are popularly supposed
to do). They do not just fail to follow through on their suspicions of bad things.
They are not merely careless birds. They bury their heads in the sand so that
they will not see or hear bad things. They deliberately avoid acquiring
unpleasant knowledge. The ostrich instruction is designed for cases in which
there is evidence that the defendant, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is
involved in shaky dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire
full knowledge or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings.
See KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, a t 223-24 (quoting United States v.
Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original).
139.
Cf. Nasra Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers, Talking to the Human Bombs,
THE NEW YORKER,Nov. 19, 2001, a t 36. In discussing Palestinian suicide bombers,
Hassan writes a s follows:
Generally, each cell consists of a leader and two or three young men. . . . Each
cell is tightly compartmentalized and secret. Cell members do not discuss their
affiliation with their friends or family, and even if two of them know each other
in normal life, they are not aware of the other's membership in the same cell.
Only the leader is known to both. Each cell, which is dissolved after the
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organizational policy to keep knowledge of other cell members to a
minimum. The cell structure not only operates to protect the
organization from penetration, but also arguably operates a s a regime
of willful blindness. By agreeing to be a n active member of a1 Qaeda,
the member agrees to blind himself or herself to the acts of other cell
members. Willful blindness can substitute for knowledge.140 So active
a1 Qaeda members are arguably willfully blind to the crimes
committed by members from other cells and thus have the necessary
mens rea (they acted "knowingly") to find the defendants not only
guilty of the substantive offenses committed by other members of the
conspiracy, but also death-eligible under Enmund-Tison.141
The Model Penal Code adopts the majority common law position
that knowing the object of the conspiracy is not necessarily enough to
satisfy the mens rea requirement for conspiracy.142 The actor must
act "purposely," intending for the object of the conspiracy to be
a c ~ o m p 1 i s h e d . lThe
~ ~ willful blindness doctrine might not permit the
government to show purpose. Nevertheless, there is authority for the
proposition t h a t knowledge alone is sufficient when the object of the
conspiracy is a serious felony, like murder.144 Furthermore,

[suicide] operation has been completed, is given a name from the Koran or from
Islamic history.
& FIELDING,
supra note 43, a t 119 (quoting Ramzi bin al-Shibh,
Id.; see also FOUDA
apparent coordinator of September 11 attacks) (describing how the attacks were
organized: "[Ilt is in short, a process of lining the cells to one another. . . .").
140. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1976); MODEL
PENALCODE§ 2.02(7).
141. The government should argue the cell structure fits precisely within Judge
Posner's definition, namely, that when a1 Qaeda members assent to the cell structure,
they "deliberately avoid acquiring unpleasant knowledge," (i.e., "knowing or strongly
suspecting that [they] are involved in shaky dealings, [they] take[ ] steps to make sure
that [they] do not acquire[] full knowledge or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of
those dealings," which, in this instance, are terrorist operations carried out by other
cells). The defense could also argue that 'howledge" alone is not enough to satisfy the
mens rea of conspiracy. The prosecution must show that the defendant's had the purpose,
intended that the objects of the conspiracy be carried out. See infra notes 142-44 and
accompanying text.
142. MODEL PENALCODE§ 5.03(1); see United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402
(2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.); infra note 144 (collecting cases on mens rea for conspiracy).
143. Peoni, 100 F.2d a t 402.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714, 793 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding ''knowinglf a sufficient culpable mental state for accomplice liability); People
v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (Cal. 1967) (suggesting in dicta that a supplier "who
furnishe[d] equipment which he knows will be used to commit a serious crime may be
deemed to be a co-conspirator) (emphasis added); see also United States v. GarciaTorres, 280 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that "[a] drug conspirator need not know
all of the details of the conspiracy, United States v. Nueva, 979 F.2d 880, 884 (1st
Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993), but it is hard to imagine how someone
furnishing a peripheral service [supplying guns to a killer and kidnapper] to a drug
conspiracy could be deemed to 'join' that conspiracy unless he knew both that the drug
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membership in a1 Qaeda with its avowed purpose of killing
Americans, including civilians, might be deemed sufficient to satisfy
the "purposely" requirement.
Members of the out-group conspiracy were presumably aware of
other crimes carried out by a1 Qaeda, for example, the bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole and the two embassy bombings in East Africa.145 The
latter two incidents left hundreds, mostly innocent civilians, dead.l46
Therefore, members of the out-group conspiracy probably assumed
that other similar actions were being contemplated by the a1 Qaeda
leadership, by other cells, or by allied terror groups.
On the other hand, a1 Qaeda members in the out-group
conspiracy would not necessarily have known or reasonably have
foreseen the scale of the September 11 attacks. Imputing intent or
even willful blindness14' to a1 Qaeda members who knew nothing

conspiracy existed and that the peripheral service being furnished was designed to foster
the conspiracy") (emphasis added); United States v. Gallishaw, 428 F.2d 760, 763 (2d
Cir. 1970) (noting that to convict defendant of bank robbery for loaning a machine gun
to the primary perpetrators, t h e Government "would have t o show at a minimum that
he knew that a bank was to be robbed") (emphasis added). T h e majority rule, however,
apparently requires a culpable mental state of "purposely," even for serious crimes. See
KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, at 709-10. However, t h e government may rely
on the "slight evidence" rule to attempt to link Moussaoui t o t h e September 11
conspirators. See, e.g., United States v . James, 528 F.2d 999, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1976).
Once the existence o f a common scheme of a conspiracy is shown, slight
evidence i s all that is required to connect a particular defendant with t h e
conspiracy (citations omitted). T h e connection may be shown b y circumstantial
evidence (citations omitted). "A person may be held as a conspirator although
h e joins t h e criminal concert at a point i n time far beyond t h e initial act o f t h e
conspirators. I f h e joins later, knowing o f t h e criminal design, and acts in
concert with the original conspirators, h e may be held responsible, not only for
everything which may be done thereafter, but also for everything which has
been done prior t o his adherence to the criminal design. . . ." Lile v . United
States, 9 Cir., 264 F.2d 278, 281 (1958), quoted w i t h approval in Nelson v .
United States, 5 Cir., 415 F.2d 483 (1969); Downing v . United States, 5 Cir.,
348 F.2d 594 (1965). T h e fact that a conspirator i s not present at, or does not
participate in, t h e commission o f any o f t h e overt acts does not, b y itself,
exonerate him. United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641, 647 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id.; see also LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 705 (citing Brent E. Newton, The Antiquated
Slight Evidence Rule, i n Federal Conspiracy Cases, 1 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS,
49, 5154 (1999) (criticizing the rule and certain federal circuits for applying it sub silentio
even after having expressly abolished it)).
145.
See The White House Determined, . . ., WASH.POST,July 25, 2003, at A15,
available at 2003 WL 56508330.
146.
See Patricia Hurtado, Bombing Case Gets New Judge, NEWSDAY,Jan. 26,
2002, at A07, available at 2002 WL 2724799 (noting 224 people were killed i n East
African embassy bombings and thousands were injured).
147. T h e problem with the doctrine o f willful blindness is that it might lower t h e
culpable mental state from knowingly to recklessly and perhaps to negligently. See
KADISH& SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, at 222 (citing United States v . Barnhart, 979
F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1992)) (attempting t o avoid convicting a defendant on t h e basis
o f a "negligently" mental state b y imposing the following two requirements on courts
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about the September 11 attacks beforehand might not comport with
their actual culpability. These other members may be willfully blind,
but not necessarily to acts of the magnitude of September 11.148
Under the willful blindness doctrine, however, members of the
out-group conspiracy may satisfy the mens rea element for the
imposition of capital punishment on secondary actors. Willful
blindness, a s a practical matter, is often tantamount to a "recklessly
indifferent" culpable mental state.149 The latter mental state is
precisely that which the Court in Tison identified as the mens rea for
imposing the death penalty on accomplices. One hopes that the Court
was in fact imposing the higher mental state of depraved indifference.
But, even under that standard, one can persuasively argue that a n
actor who joins a known terrorist organization like a1 Qaeda is
demonstrating depraved indifference to human life.150

considering whether to instruct on "willful blindness": ( 1 ) defendant must be
subjectively aware of a high probability o f illegal conduct; and (2) defendant must
purposefully contrive not to learn of the illegal conduct). But see KADISH &
SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, at 224 (citing David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO.
L.J. 957, 962 (1999)),i n which he demonstrates that the "high probability" requirement
may be easily abused. This is not t o suggest that Moussaoui or the average foot solider
i n a1 Qaeda possesses a "negligent" culpable mental state.
148. I t is possible that those who planned the September 11 attacks and those
who carried t h e m out had not realized how successful the attacks would be. They might
not have known or expected that the attacks would bring down the towers. Elisabeth
Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The Video; bin Laden, On Tape, Boasts of Trade Center
Attacks; U.S. Says It Proves His Guilt, N.Y. T I M E SDec.
,
14, 2001, at A l ; Judith Miller,
A Nation Challenged: The Mastermind; A Glimpse, Guard Down, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2001, at A l . In that event, they are still responsible for what they had done, given that
they intended to commit murder and other crimes in the first place. See Harvey v.
State, 681 A.2d 628, 637 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that single mens rea may apply to
additional and unexpected results).
149.
See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a
Criminal Mens Rea, 81 CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
191, 195 (1990). But see Jonathan
Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J.
2231, 2238-40 (1993) (distinguishing recklessness from willful blindness and
determining that willful blindness essentially constitutes knowledge).
150. The Model Penal Code defines "depraved indifference murder" as a criminal
homicide that "is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life." MODELPENALCODE5 210.2(1)@).T h e MPC
defines "recklessly" as "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element [ofthe offense]exists or will result from [the actor's] conduct.
Id. 5 2.02 T h e risk must be of such a nature and degree . . . and the circumstances
known t o him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a
law abiding person would observe i n the actor's situation." Id. By joining a known
violent terrorist organization like a1 Qaeda, an actor would be "consciously
disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable r i s k that he or she would be, among
other things, assisting individuals to kill innocent civilians. Such conduct is "a gross
deviation" and arguably "manifests extreme indifference to the value o f human life." Id.
This assumes that terrorist violence is unjustified under law. A soldier who kills
during war but who follows humanitarian law, is guilty neither of a war crime nor a
domestic crime. See Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11; Attacks on the
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Although the out-group conspirators appear to satisfy the mens
rea requirements, they do not appear to satisfy the actus reus
element. Tison requires not only that the secondary actors exhibit
reckless indifference to life, but also that they be "major
participant[sIwin the underlying felony. If the actors had nothing to
do with September 11 conspiracy a t all, aside from being out-group
conspiracy members, then the actus reus element would not be met,
and they would not be death eligible. It is "so attenuated151 to make
out-group conspiracy members "major participant[sIv in the in-group
conspiracy resulting in death and destruction when they played no
role in that conspiracy. Thus, under Enmund-Tison, out-group
conspiracy members should generally not be death-eligible.

C. The Out-Group Conspirator Who Knew about the September 11
Attacks, but Did Nothing to Advance Them
The same answer should apply to the conspirator who knows
about the conspiracy, but has done nothing to bring the conspiracy
about. Mens rea may be satisfied, but active participation is not. Thus
if Moussaoui knew about September 11, but was here on another
mission and did nothing to further the September 11 attacks, he
should not be classified as a major participant. His allegedly lying to
FBI officials as to his purpose in taking flying lessons when he was
arrested and his presumably failing to disclose the September 11plot
would not appear to satisfy the major participation element.152 This

Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'LL. 325, 327-28 (2003). Given that the September 11
attacks constitute crimes against humanity if carried out by a private terror group and
a war crime if carried out by the Taliban government (or if a1 Qaeda was the alter ego
of the Taliban government), those responsible for the attacks may not escape the label
of common criminal, international criminal, or war criminal. See infra notes 179-90
& FIELDING,
supra note 43, a t 118 (quoting "aland accompanying text. But see FOUDA
Qaeda Statement" justifying the attacks, for among other reasons, West's and United
States' establishing Israel, for Israel's killing Palestinians, for supporting allegedly
corrupt Arab regimes, for supporting India in Kashmir, for the then blockade of Iraq,
for using military force to keep the natural resource of many Arab states, oil, a t a low
price, and for violating Koran regarding tolerance of alcohol, interest, homosexuality,
adultery, and prostitution).
151.
See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text in which the Tison Court
distinguishes Enrnund. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149, 157 (1987); see also United
States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Dlue process constrains the
application of Pinkerton where the relationship between the defendant and the
substantive offense is slight."), vacated on other grounds, 532 U.S. 1036 (1993); United
States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on Castaneda to find
unconstitutional application of Pinkerton doctrine).
152.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing these allegations); see
also McCord, supra note 101, at 875-78 (offering excellent discussion of meaning of
"major participant"). The indictment does not allege that Moussaoui knew about the
September 11 plot before his arrest.
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certainly does not foreclose criminal liability,153 but it should
foreclose the death penalty.

D. The In-Group Conspirator Who Knew Nothing about the Attacks
but Who Played a Major Role i n the Conspiracy
A more difficult question is posed by the a1 Qaeda member who
knew nothing about the September 11 attacks beforehand, but who
played a n important role in the conspiracy. For example, assume
hypothetically that the actor, a n a1 Qaeda member, knew nothing
either about the planned attacks or about the idea of using civilian
airliners as missiles, but purchased the plane tickets on orders of a1
Qaeda superiors. From the actor's point of view, he or she would be
carrying out a fairly low-level task of purchasing tickets for what one
presumably would believe were just routine flights. Yet, the purchase
of the tickets, as noted above, played a key role in the conspiracy. Is
such a n actor death-eligible under Enmund-Tison?
This issue resembles that which arose in the context of depraved
indifference murder under the Model Penal Code (MPC). Under the
MPC, recklessness satisfies the mens rea for voluntary
m a n ~ 1 a u g h t e r . lRecklessness
~~
plus "extreme indifference to the
value of human life" satisfies the mens rea for depraved indifference
murder.155 The issue was whether the "plus elements" are tested by a
subjective standard or a n objective one. Over a strong dissent, the
New York Court of Appeals concluded that the additional elements
were tested by a n objective standard.156 In that case the defendant
was thus unable to use his voluntary intoxication to attempt to
negate the plus elements of extreme indifference to reduce the offense
from depraved heart murder to involuntary manslaughter
(manslaughter in the second degree). Given the vagueness of the
Tison holding, the U.S. Supreme Court could very well follow that
lead or some similar approach and uphold the death sentence of an
ostensibly out-group conspiracy member who objectively played a
major role in the in-group conspiracy, but did not know she was doing
so.

153.
Cf. Government's Position on Sentencing and Government Sentencing
Memorandum, United States v. Lindh, Crim. No. 02-37A (E.D. V a . Sept. 27, 2002),
available at http://news.findlaw.commdocs/docs/docsflindh/uslindh
92602psentmem.pdf (last
visited June 30, 2003) (defendant pleaded guilty t o aiding terrorist organization and
other crimes and received 20 year sentence).
154. MODELPENALCODE5 210.3(l)(a)(1980).
Id. 8 210.2(1)@).
155.
156.
People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
953 (1984).
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Such a conclusion is disturbing in the death penalty context.
With the exception of felony murder for some enumerated underlying
felonies, depraved indifference (depraved heart murder a t common
law) traditionally has been second-degree murder and therefore a
non-capital homicide.15' Secondly, the Supreme Court has noted a s
follows:

.

Unless the imposition of the death penalty . . ."measurably contributes
to one or both of these goals [deterrence and retribution], it 'is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment." Enmund [v.
Florida], 458 U.S., at 798 (other citations omitted). With respect to
retribution-the
interest in seeing that the offender gets his "just
deserts7'-the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily
depends on the culpability of the offender.158

Admittedly, such a n actor is both highly blameworthy and highly
dangerous. Yet executing such actors for what they believe is the
carrying out of a low-level function violates the principle of just
desert.159

E. The In-Group Conspirator Who Knew About the Attacks, but Who
Played a Minor Role i n the Conspiracy
A variant on this hypothetical is the in-group conspiracy member
who plays a minor role in the conspiracy. Suppose on September 10,
2001, for example, the actor put up for the night one of the September
11 hijackers. Suppose this actor is a n a1 Qaeda member who knew of
the September 11 plot when agreeing to put up the hijacker.
Presumably such a n actor would be only a minor participant i n the
conspiracy. Before September 11 the hijackers could easily have
gotten a hotel room without incurring much risk.160 The analysis is
the converse of the individual who had no idea she in fact was playing
a major role. Although mens rea is satisfied for the minor actor, the
actus reus component, that of being a major participant, is not. So the
in-group conspiracy member who plays a minor role should not be
death-eligible.

157. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, a t 396.
158. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (emphasis added).
159. Of course, one could attack this position by arguing that the cell structure
and its accompanying regime of willful blindness thus immunizes a1 Qaeda members
from the death penalty. To the extent that the willful blindness amounts to reckless
indifference as opposed to knowing conduct, it should not render one death eligible.
Admittedly, Tison may very well support the imposition of the death penalty on such
an actor, one who exhibits reckless indifference to human life but does not know the
significance of her role.
160. Mohammed Atta, said to be the "field commander" of the September 11
terrorists, in fact stayed a t a Comfort Inn outside of Portland, Maine on this date. See
FOUDA & FIELDING,
supra note 43, a t 142.
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None of the states or the federal government has dealt with
crimes of this magnitude. The Timothy McVeigh-Oklahoma City
bombing case never reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In that
domestic terrorism case, there was never any question that McVeigh
was the primary actor, so that case does not apply here in any
event.161 His accomplice, Terry Nichols, convicted as a co-conspirator,
l ~ ~ World War 11, the Supreme Court
was given life in p r i ~ 0 n . During
affirmed the death sentences of eight German spies by a hastily
l ~ ~ death penalty jurisprudence of the
convened military t r i b ~ n a 1 . The
Court, however, has changed so significantly since World War I1 that
that precedent is of questionable vitality today.164 Nonetheless,
Justice O'Connor stated in a speech, that given the events of
September 11, we would have to expect new limitations on our civil
liberties.165 The Court's death penalty jurisprudence could evolve
quickly into one of those 1irnitati0ns.l~~

161.
Excerpt from Ashcroft Statement on Delaying Execution of Timothy
McVeigh, N.Y. T I M E SMay
,
12, 2001, at A12.
162.
See Jo Thomas, Oklahoma City Verdict: The Overview; Death Penalty Ruled
Out as Nichols Jury Deadlocks i n Oklahoma Bombing Case, N.Y. T I M E S , Jan. 8, 1998,
at Al. T h e State of Oklahoma, however, recently indicted Nichols and i s seeking the
death penalty i n connection with the Oklahoma City bombing. See Dan Rather,
Oklahoma City Bombing Co-Conspirator to Stand Trial on State Murder Charges, (CBS
television broadcast, May 20, 2003), available i n LEXIS, News Group File.
163.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1942).
164. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Comment, Military Tribunals and
Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
261 (Spring
2002). But see Hamdi v . Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (relying i n part on
Ex parte Quirin for the proposition that the courts should defer to t h e Executive i n
determining t h e status of "enemy combatants" captured "in the zone of active combat"),
cert. granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004). See also George
Terwilliger e t al., The War on Terrorism: Law Enforcement or National Security?, T H E
FEDERALISTSOC'Y NAT'L SECURITYW H I T EPAPERS ON TERRORISM,
available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications~errorismilitarribunals.htm;
cf. A1 Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1142-44 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting attempts o f foreign
nationals detained i n Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to obtain legal review of their detention),
cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003).
165. Tony Mauro, Court Watch: Court Weighs i n on Stops at the Border, LEGAL
T I M E SDec.
,
3,2001, at 8.
166. T h e Supreme Court did limit the death penalty i n one important case last
t e r m and two important cases the previous term. See Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct.
2527, 2535-37 (2003) (O'Connor, J.) (reversing death sentence on grounds o f ineffective
assistance o f counsel i n failing to investigate petitioner's troubled childhood); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 2434-43 (2002) (finding unconstitutional state death penalty
statute that authorizes trial court alone, not jury, t o determine whether aggravating
circumstances exist t o justify imposing penalty of death); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321-25 (2002) (finding unconstitutional the imposition o f the death penalty on
mentally retarded offenders).Few commentators, however, believe that t h e Court has
done a n about-face i n its death penalty jurisprudence. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky,
Supreme Court Decided Crucial Issues, CAL. BAR J., Aug. 2002, at 1, 20 ("There is no
indication that these decisions portend the Supreme Court finding the death penalty
unconstitutional."). Interestingly, however, i n Atkins, the Court relied i n part on the
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IV. POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS,
INTERNATIONALLAW, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL
REPERCUSSIONS
OF EXECUTING
AL QAEDAMEMBERS

EVAif the U.S. Supreme Court were to conclude that executing
a n actor like Moussaoui is constitutional, sound policy considerations
argue against such executions. This Article will first summarize the
arguments in favor of imposing the death penalty on terrorists. After
proposing a definition of terrorism, this Article will discuss
arguments against imposing the death penalty on politically
motivated terrorists in general and on the a1 Qaeda terrorists in
particular. Included here are a constellation of policy questions,
namely, how the death penalty interferes with a n alternative strategy
against terrorism; how the death penalty might create martyrs; how
it might hinder cooperation with our allies in the war against terror;
how the death penalty relates to the problem of the so-called "ticking
bomb terrorist"; and how executing a1 Qaeda members might affect
U.S. civilians and military in the field.
A. Summary of Arguments in Favor of the Death Penalty
Some of the arguments generally advanced in favor of the death
penalty apply to international terrorists. Chief among these would be
retribution, both the just desert strand1G7 as well a s the wild justice,
revenge strand168 of retribution theory. filling over 3,000 innocent
people, not to mention the other grave crimes that the hijackers
committed, demands retribution.169 Even under the just desert strand

practice of other countries in determining that the death penalty for defendants who
suffered from mental retardation violated the Constitution: "Moreover, within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Atkins, 536 U.S. a t 316
n.21 (citing Brief for The European Union a s Amicus Curiae in McCarver v. North
Carolina); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on
the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVISL. REV.1085, 1129-30 (2002).
167. This strand attempts to arrive at "just outcomes; the emphasis is on what
the offender fairly merits for his crime." Andrew Von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE
HANDBOOK
OF CRIMEAND PUNISHMENT
659, 666 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (emphasis
added). See also DRESSLER, supra note 58, at 17 (describing this notion of retributive
justice as "punishment [being] . . . a means of securing a moral balance in the society").
168. See Robert Nozick, Retributive Punishment, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 196-98 (John Arthur & William Shaw eds., 1984) (distinguishing
in detail retribution from revenge).
169. Furthermore, the Islamic countries themselves are strong advocates of the
death penalty. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, International Law a n d Abolition of the
Death Penalty: Recent Developments, 4 ILSA J . INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 545 (1998)
(quoting Sudan delegate to Rome Conference to establish International Criminal
Court, who "described capital punishment as 'a divine right according to some
religions, in particular Islam"'); Jennifer Cunningham, Frontier Justice is Put on the
Dock, THE GLASGOW HERALD, June 25, 1997, at 17 (noting Saudi Arabia's practice of
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as opposed to the wild justice strand, the penalty of death is justified.
Intentionally taking the life of so many innocents recalls the horrors
of the Nazi regime.170 The culpability level, a t least of the active
conspirators, is a s high as can be imagined.171 Even i i suicide
bombers may not be generally deterred,172 those responsible for the
September 11 attacks warrant the death penalty: "'The truth is that
some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate
punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of
whether it is a deterrent or not.""73
,
Furthermore, the theories of incapacitation and .sp6&ic
deterrence would appear to be furthered by the death ~ e n a 1 t y . l ' ~
Reformation of these offenders is unthinkable. Imposing the death
penalty would also be justified under the denunciation theory, the
theory espoused by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, that the
>

beheading convicted rapists, drug smugglers and murderers); Dominus, supra note 9,
at 30 and passim.
170. After World War 11, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
sentenced to death twelve high-ranking members of the Nazi German Regime for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. A number of doctors and SS leaders were
likewise given the death penalty. See War Crimes Trials, 27 FUNK & WAGNALLS
NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA
146-47 (1986).
171. Retribution looks only backward at what the actor has done: "Even if a civil
society resolved to dissolve itself. . . the last murderer lying in the prison ought to be
executed . . . ." DRESSLER, supra note 58, a t 18 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT,THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 197-98 (W. Hastie trans., 1887)). The utilitarians, on the other
hand, look forward to determine whether the punishment will provide "an overall
social benefit." DRESSLER, supra note '58, a t 16. The arguments that are set forth below
draw greatly from utilitarian theory.
172. One could also argue that, although suicide bombers may not be deterred
by the death penalty, their handlers might be. Cf. Norman L. Green et al., Capital
Punishment in the Age of Terrorism, 41 CATH.LAW. 187, 225 (2002) (comments of
Kenneth Roth) (noting that some of the leaders of a1 Qaeda, including Osama bin
Laden, himself, seem less than keen on serving a s suicide bombers).
173. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 453 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lord Justice Denning, Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, 207 (1949-1953)).
Because the only genuinely humane, immediate response to atrocities like the
Washington sniper attacks and Mohamed Atta's airline hijackings-and the
necessary formal response of a n organized civil society-is collective fury.
Along with a controlled but ferocious determination to incapacitate and crush
the perpetrators a s quickly a s possible. Deep-think analysis can and must wait.
David Tell, Yes, The Sniper Was a Terrorist, Editorial, 8 WKLY. STANDARD,
Nov. 4,
2002 a t 7, 8; cf. Note, Responding to Terrorism, Crime, Punishment, a n d War, 115
HARV.L. REV. 1217, 1233 (2002) (noting that "the resurgence of the death penalty in
the thirty years since the Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia reflects the
ascendancy of retributive theories of punishment").
174. See infra note 253; see also Hirsch, supra note 167, a t 660-61 (describing
incapacitation as "penal consequentialism"). But given the apparently overwhelming
number of individuals who are willing to engage in so-called "martyrdom operations,"
incapacitating one offender may do little to stop others. See supra note 139.
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death penalty serves to "express society's condemnation and the
relative seriousness of the crime," 175 in this case, the September 11
attacks.176

B. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
Despite the strength and appeal of many of the arguments for
imposing the death penalty on those responsible for the outrage of
September 11, there are others arguments that should be considered.
~ l t h o u g hthe arguments that follow appear grounded in utilitarian
theory,177I suspect they ultimately reflect Professor Charles Black's
observation that the death penalty is an evil, because, among other
things, "it extinguishes, after untellable suffering, the most mysterious
and wonderful thing we know, human life; this reason has many
harmonics . . .
1.Defining Terrorism

The term "terrorism" has defied attempts at definition. Some
define it as acts of violence by a private organization against the state
~~
say terrorism largely embraces attacks
or ~ i v i 1 i a n s . l Others

175. DRESSLER, supra note 58, a t 18; Denning, supra note 173, at 207
("Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing;
and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted
for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of
citizens for them.").
176. KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 56, a t 106 (reprinting an excerpt from
EMILEDURKHEIM,THE DMSION OF LAW IN SOCIETY
62-63 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984)).
177. See Jeremy Bentham, Cases Unmeet for Punishment, in THE PORTABLE
ENLIGHTENMENT
READER 541 (Issaack Kramnick ed., 1995) (reasoning that
punishment should not be meted out "3. Where it is unprofitable, or too expensive:
where the mischief it would produce would be greater than what is prevented. 4. Where
it is needless: where the mischief may be prevented, or cease of itself without
it . . . "); see also supra note 167 and accompanying text.
178. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 MD. L. REV.
289, 291 (1971); see also Anthony G . Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 346,352-53 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1982) ('The plain message of
capital punishment . . . is that life ceases to be sacred whenever someone with the
power to take it away decides that there is a sufficiently compelling pragmatic reason
to do SO."). But see Walter Berns, The Morality of Anger, in THEDEATHPENALTYIN
AMERICA,supra, a t 333, 334 ("[Simon] Wiesenthal allows us to see that it is right,
morally right, to be angry with criminals and to express that anger publicly, officially,
and in an appropriate manner, which may require the worst of them to be executed.");
Ernest Van den Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Practical a n d Moral Analysis,
in THE DEATH PENALTYIN AMERICA, supra, a t 332 ("If it were shown that no
punishment is more deterrent than a trivial fine, capital punishment for murder would
remain just, even if not useful.").
179. See JORDAN
J. PAUSTET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS
995, 997 (2000) (quoting U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Mar.
1989) rmerrorism' is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended
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animated by racism or colonialism and excludes acts of "struggle" and
"resistance" carried out by so-called "national liberation movements"
even if those acts are aimed a t innocent civilians.1s0 For purposes of
this Article, I consider crimes of terrorism to mean "war crimes" and
"crimes against humanity" a s defined by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).lB1 The Rome Statute defines a
crime against humanity a s "a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population."ls2 Such attacks are defined
a s "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [such.)
acts . . . pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack."lB3As of this writing, the ICC has been
signed by 139 countries and has been ratified by ninety-two
countries.ls4 Using the ICC definitions accomplishes a two-fold
objective: it draws from a source of law now recognized by the vast
majority of states a s authoritative, and it addresses critics' major

to influence an audience. 'International terrorism' is terrorism involving the citizens or
territory of more than one country."). For a good discussion of this issue, see BRUCE
HOFFMAN,
INSIDETERRORISM
13-44 (1998).
180.
See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY& EDWARDS. HERMAN,1 THE POLITICAL
OF HUMANRIGHTS:THE WASHINGTON
CONNECTION
AND THIRD WORLD
ECONOMY
FASCISM6 (1979) (criticizing the terms "terrorism" and "terrorist" as being applied to
"the use of violence by individuals and marginal groups" while characterizing much
more favorably "[olfficial violence [by states] which is far more extensive in both scale
and destructiveness," that is, "wholesale as opposed to retail terror"); Charles
Krauthammer, The Ball's Still in Arafat's Court, WASH.POST,Nov. 19, 1988, a t A23
(criticizing U.N. Resolutions defining terrorism).
181. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7.1, U.N. Doc.
AIConf. 18319 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http:Nwww.un.org/lawlicc
lstatutelromefra.htm.
182. Id. Article 7.l(a) provides a s follows: "For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime
against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; . . . " Id.; see also Jordan Paust, Threats to
Accountability after Nuremberg: Crimes against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and
National Fora, 12 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 547, 553-54 (1995) (criticizing Article 5 of
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia statute on ground that its
definition of crimes against humanity needlessly restricted its scope as compared to
customary law definition of crimes against humanity).
183. ICC Statute, supra note 181, art. 7.2(a). The subsection in full states as
follows: "Attack directed against any civilian population means a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack." Id. (emphasis added). Compare the definition of terrorism
provided by Caleb Carr, a definition that includes state terrorism as well as terrorism
carried out by non-state actors: "Terrorism . . . is simply the contemporary name given
to, and the modern permutation of, warfare deliberately waged against civilians with
the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents
of such violence find objectionable." CALEBCARR,THE LESSONS OF TERROR 6 (2002).
184.
ICC, Ratification Status, available at http:llwww.un.orgflawlicc/statutel
romefra.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
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objection to policies treating state terror and private terror,
disparately.ls5
The attacks of September 11easily satisfy the elements of crimes
against humanity. By hijacking the four civilian airliners,
deliberately crashing two of the hijacked airliners into huge civilian
office buildings, thus murdering all the civilians on the aircrafts and
murdering thousands of civilians within the buildings, the nineteen
hijackers and their accomplices committed "multiple" acts "directed a t
any civilian population." The coordination of the attacks
demonstrates that the attacks were committed "pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy." The language
66
organizational policy"lS6 was expressly intended to include non-state
actors such as private terror groups.lS7 If a1 Qaeda acted on its own in
carrying out the September 11 attacks, those responsible in a1 Qaeda
should be found guilty of crimes against humanity.

185.
See CHOMSKY, supra note 180, at 6 ; see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ,WHY
TERRORISM
WORKS 4-9 (2002). But see Byford, supra note 1, at 34-36 (arguing that a
simple definition o f "terrorism" is impossible to make, that both ends and means
employed to those ends must be examined to determine whether individuals have
engaged i n "terrorism").
186. See Preparatory Comm'n on the Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC12000/1/ADD.2 (2000), art. 7 , available at http:llwwwl.umn.edu/
humanrtslinstreeliccelementsofcrimes.html#~ftn36(last visited Mar. 13, 2003). The
Final Draft Elements of Crimes of the ICC further supports this interpretation:
"Attack directed against a civilian population" i n these context elements is
understood to mean a course o f conduct involving the multiple commission of
acts referred to i n Article 7 , paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian
population, pursuant to or i n furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. I t is
understood that "policy to commit such an a t t a c k requires that the State or
organization actively promote or encourage such attack against a civilian
population.
Id., art. 7 , Intro. (emphasis added); see also James D. Fry, Terrorism as a Crime
Against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J .
INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF.169, 191 (2002);Paust, supra note 150, at 327. But see William
A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-state Actors i n Non-International Armed Conflict, 26
FORDHAM
INT'LL. J. 907, 924-25 (2003) (arguing that the September 11 attacks do not
constitute "crimes against humanity" within the definition o f either the ICC or custom).
187. Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court:
Possibilities and Problems, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 36 (2002) (citing Mahnoush H .
Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22,
31 (1999));see also In Re Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting
Great Britain's request to extradite PIRA member charged with attacking a convoy of
British soldiers i n Northern Ireland, but stating i n dicta that the political offense
exception would not protect individuals who placed bombs i n public places, an act that
violates international law or acts that would violate the Geneva conventions); cf. In Re
McMullen, No-3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal. 1979) reprinted i n Cong. Rec. 16,585 (1986)
(denying Great Britain's request to extradite Provisional Irish Republican Army
member and noting that PIRA member's allegedly attacking British military barracks
did not constitute war crime or crime against humanity).
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If a state, such a s Afghanistan, sponsored these attacks, then
those responsible in the Taliban government a s well a s any other
accomplices or conspirators are almost certainly guilty of war crimes
for carrying out the outrages of September 11.lS8 Restating longestablished treaty and customary international law, the ICC codifies
a s a war crime, "intentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct
part in the hostilities; [and] (ii) intentionally directing attacks against
civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives."1s9
Except for the attack on the Pentagon, all the attacks were on
civilians and civilian objects.lgO
2. Alternative Strategies against Terrorism
In the fight against terrorism, we must consider with whom we
are dealing and the most effective approach for reducing, if not
eliminating, the threat to our cities and suburbs, facilities, aircraft,
communications, and, above all, our people. There are more than one
billion Muslims in the world.lg1 In the Arab world, there are more
than 200 million people.lg2 Few democracies exist in the Islamic

188.
See Jordan J . Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting
fllegality, 23 MICH.J . INT'L L. 1,8 n.16 (2001).
189.
ICC Statute, supra note 181, art. 8.2(b) (emphasis added). This full
subsection, with its prefatory language is a s follows:
For purposes of this statute, "war crimes" means: . . . (b) Other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict,
within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts: (i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population
a s such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; (ii)
intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which
are not military objectives.
Id. art. 8.2.
190. To keep the focus on attacks on unequivocally noncombatant civilians, this
discussion of crimes against humanity does not include the attack on the Pentagon,
even though civilian employees of the Defense Department died in that attack.
Furthermore, this is not to suggest that the attack against the Pentagon, aside from
the manner of making the attack, was not a crime. I t certainly was a domestic crime
(actually numerous domestic crimes), and, to the extent that a1 Qaeda was not the alter
ego of the Taliban and thereby acting a s a state, those who conspired to carry out or
who aided and abetted the attack are criminally responsible. If the Taliban were the
alter ego of a1 Qaeda and entered into a state of armed conflict with the United States
on September 11, 2001, that component of the attack would probably not constitute a
war crime but seizing and crashing the civilian airliner into the Pentagon would be.
NEWENCYCLOPEDIA,
Islam (2003), available in LEXIS
FUNK& WAGNALLS
191.
Reference File.
FUNK& WAGNALLS
NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA,
Arabs (2003), available in LEXIS
192.
Reference File.
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world;lg3 virtually all of the Arab countries are run by dictators or
kings, some more despotic than others.lg4 The Arab countries rank
last in the world in ratings on freedom of the press and other
freedoms.195 Aside from the lack of individual rights, the standard of
living has declined in that part of the world for the last thirty
years.lg6 Nearly fifty percent of the population in the Arab world is
under the age of twenty-five,lg7 with one-third under the age of
fifteen.198 In the oil rich countries-the Gulf States, for example"economic wealth has benefited a relatively limited few, and has not
been distributed to poorer Islamic countries or to their very large
migrant communities."l99 The young face little chance of climbing out
of devastating and demoralizing poverty and repressi~n.~oO

193. The leading one is Turkey, which, unfortunately, possesses one of the worst if
not the worst human rights records i n Europe. See Endemic Torture i n Turkey Must End
Immediately, (Amnesty International), Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://web.amnesty.org/
ai.nsflIndex/EUR440772001?0penDocument&of=COUNTRIES\TKEY (last visited
Mar. 13, 2003). Turkey's parliament has, however, abolished the death penalty i n
peacetime, a step that Amnesty International had been urging for decades and which the
European Union has required as a condition of Turkey's membership. See Turkey:
Abolition of the Death Penalty Welcomed, (Amnesty International) Aug. 2,2002, available
http:llweb.amnesty.org/ai.nsflIndex/EUR44O362OO2?OpenD0~ument&0f=Abolition
at
COUNTRIES\TURKEY (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). Whether this also signals that
Turkey will end its practice of torture and other human rights abuses remains to be seen.
194. See LEWIS, supra note 67, at 117-18;see also Fareed Zakaria, The Politics of
Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at 22.
195. See Zakaria, supra note 194, at 24.
196. Id. at 25; see also LEWIS, supra note 67, 114-17. Concerning economic
failure Lewis notes that "Israel's per capita GDP was three and half times that of
Lebanon and Syria, twelve times that of Jordan, and thirteen and a half times that of
Egypt." Id. at 117 (citing Arab Human Development Report 2002; Creating
Opportunities for Future Generations, sponsored by the Regional Bureau for Arab
StatesNNDP, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development). He discussed the
intellectual life of the Arab world again quoting the Arab Human Development Report,
"'The Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one-fifthof the number that
Greece translates. The accumulative total of translated books since the Caliph
Maa'moun's [sic] time [the ninth century] is about 100,000, almost the average Spain
translates in one year."' Id. at 115-16. Even i n Saudi Arabia, per capita income
plummeted from $28,600 i n 1981 t o $6,800 i n 2001. Eric Rouleau, Trouble i n the
Kingdom, FOREIGNAFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 75, 8 5 .
197. Zakaria, supra note 194, at 22, 32.
198. Id. 'Today, two i n five Saudis are under 16 years old. [Saudi Arabia's]
population has exploded while its economy has stagnated with the result that its per
capita income has dropped." Michael Scott Doran, Palestine, Iraq, and American
Strategy, FOREIGN AFF.,Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 19, 28; see also Editorial, The Anger of Arab
Youth, N.Y. TIMES,Aug. 15,2002, at A22.
199. Max Taylor & John Horgan, The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of
Islamic Fundamentalism, 13 TERRORISM& POL. VIOLENCE37, 41 (2001). These
commentators add that "to many devout Muslims the effectsof increased oil wealth have
been to increase the influence of the West and challenge the social basis of Islam, rather
than to complement and enhance it." Id.
200.
"Even i f many terrorists are not directly driven by poverty, the inequities o f
globalization feed a general anti-Westernism that is a seedbed for Islamism." Michael
Hirsh, Bush and the World, FOREIGNAFF. Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18, 28. But see
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"Throughout the region [the Middle East] [Arab] people have become
ever more disillusioned with the deeply-entrenched dictatorships in
their own countries, with the collapse of democratic institutions,
hollow nationalistic rhetoric, and with their failing economies."201
Given the failure of economic and political institutions in the
Arab world, it is not surprising that religion has emerged as a major
force.202 In the Muslim culture, religion and politics are intertwined
in a way reminiscent of Western Europe before the R e f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~ ~
The fight against terrorism thus needs to embrace the social and
political reality of the Arab world and the nature of the organization
we are fighting.
The available evidence suggests that a1 Qaeda is a network
rather than a single, unified military organization.204 As one
commentator has written, "[Hlaving suffered the destruction of its

DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 185, a t 25 (noting that "the vast majority of groups with
equivalent or more compelling causes-and
with far greater poverty and
disadvantagehave never resorted to terrorism"); FAREEDZAKARIA, THE FUTURE
OF
FREEDOM ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
AT HOME AND ABROAD138 (2003) (arguing that "[tlhe
problem i s wealth not poverty" and that unearned income from oil revenues, or, for
example in the case of Egypt from the Suez Canal and the United States, "relieves the
government of the need to tax its people-and in return provide something to them, in
the form of accountability, transparency, and even representation").
201.
See Amanat, supra note 67, a t 29; see also LEWIS,supra note 67, a t 117-19.
Given the failure of the economic and political institutions in Islamic countries, their
people are outraged: "The resulting anger is naturally directed first against their
rulers, and then against those whom they see as keeping those rulers in power for
selfish reasons." Id. a t 119. This Article does not discuss economic and political
measures necessary to enhance human, civil and economic rights in the Arab and
Islamic worlds. See Peter G . Peterson, Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, a t 74, 75.
202.
A noted scholar of religion, Karen Armstrong, has observed that the
resounding defeat of the Arab States by Israel in the 1967 war led to a religious revival
in the Arab States: "After the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies during the 1967
Six-Day War against Israel in 1967, there was a swing toward religion throughout the
ISLAM: A SHORT
HISTORY 171 (2000).
Middle East." KAREN ARMSTRONG,
203.
Id. at 169-73; see also LEWIS, supra note 67, a t 6-8 (noting that "[dluring
Muhammad's lifetime, the Muslims became a t once a political and a religious
community with the Prophet as head of state" and contending that Islam remains
deeply involved with politics and state power); Taylor & Horgan, supra note 199, at 42
(noting that one of the central positions of Islamic fundamentalism is "the general
equation of the state with the implementation of Islam").
WKLY.,Aug. 8-14, 2002,
204.
See Diaa Rashwan, Impossible to Fight, AL-AHRAM
available a t http:Nwww.weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/598/opll.htm (last visited June 20,
2003) (observing that Americans had now accepted the European view that "Al Qa'eda
is actually nothing more than a network and that the violent Islamacist groups have no
unified command, but communicate and cooperate when it suits their different
purposes."). Al Qaeda was created in the 1980s from three terrorist organizations: '%in
Laden's circle of 'Afghan' Arabs, together with two factions from Egypt, the Islamic
Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the latter led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a1 Qaeda's
top theoretician." See Paul Berman, The Philosopher of Islamic Terror, N.Y.TIMES
MAG., Mar. 23, 2003, at 24.
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sanctuary in Afghanistan two years ago, a1 Qaeda's decentralized
organization has become more decentralized
Another
commentator has analogized a1 Qaeda to "a holding company r u n by a
council (shura) including representatives of terrorist movements."206
I t has also been described as the terrorist equivalent of the Ford
Foundation, providing money and other resources for individual
terrorists or movements that propose terrorist projects.207
The nature of the organization suggests the means of combating
it. Tactically, the United States and its allies must bring to justice
those responsible for carrying out the outrages of September 11 and
to defeat those who continue to attempt to terrorize the United
S t a t e ~ . ~Strategically,
O~
the United States and its Coalition partners
must take steps to end support in the Arab and greater Muslim world
for a1 Qaeda and others who would resort to terrorism.209 The

Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGNAFF., Ju1.-Aug. 2003, a t 27,
205.
available at 2003 WL 57276699. Stern adds that a1 Qaeda apparently has put into
practice so-called "'leaderless resistance,"' a tactic popularized by Louis Beam of the
Aryan Nations, an American Neo-Nazi group. With the advent of the Internet, leaders
do not necessarily have to secretly issue orders or to "pay operatives," rather, "they
inspire small cells or individuals to take action on their own initiative." Id.; see also
Stevenson, supra note 8, a t 85; Eric Bonabeau, Scale Free Networks, SCIENCE,May
2003, abstract available at ~http:Nwww.sciam.comlarticle.cfm?colID=l&articleID=
000312F5-B86B-1E90-8EA5809EC5880000.
206.
See Conesa, supra note 67.
207.
Scott Peterson, Islamacists Escalate Fight in N. Iraq, CHRISTIANSCI.
MONITOR,Nov. 22, 2002, a t 1 (quoting James Lindsay of the Brookings Institution); see
also BURKE,supra note 20, a t 208 (noting that "a1 Qaeda hardcore" rejected volunteers
who requested martyrdom operations unless they "came up with their own ideas for
attacks"). A1 Qaeda can also be analogized to joint venture capitalists, ("individuals
would approach the chief executive and board (bin Laden, Atef et al.) with ideas they
believed were worthy of support") or a publishing house ("Freelancers would approach
them with ideas that would sometimes be funded and resourced but often rejected"). I d
a t 208-09.
See Nicholas Lemann, Letter from Washington, What Terrorists Want; Is
208.
There a Better Way to Defeat a1 Qaeda?, NEWYORKER,Oct. 29, 2001, a t 36.
209.
See Harold H. Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN.L. REV. 1479,
1497-1500 (2003) (criticizing, a s counter-productive, Bush Administration's largely
unilateralist approach to combating terrorism and Administration's violating
international law in process); Thomas Carothers, Promoting Democracy a n d Fighting
Terror, FOREIGNAFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, a t 84, 97 (criticizing Bush Administration's
current strategy in handling the war on terror as not paying enough attention to even
handedly promoting democracy around world). See also Hirsh, supra note 200, noting
a s follows:
But a t the same time, the nature of the terrorist threat demonstrated the
necessity of bolstering the international community, which is built on
nonproliferation agreements, intelligence cooperation, and legitimizing
institutions such a s the UN, as well as a broad consensus on democracy, free
markets, and human rights. It also demonstrates the necessity of a valuesdriven foreign policy-and of nation building under multilateral auspices in
places such a s Afghanistan.
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decentralized nature. of a1 Qaeda underlines the importance of United
States' gaining the cooperation and good will not only of governments
but also of their law enforcement personnel and of individual citizens
in Arab and other Muslim states.210 In other words, to root out those
responsible for the attacks and who pose a continuing threat, we need
a firm, but measured response, simultaneously demonstrating that
we are not attacking all Muslims or Arabs or applying a . double
standard to Muslims or Arabs.211
>

Id. at 18; O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 2, at 1750-51 (noting that the United States
is resorting to draconian emergency measures similar to those employed by Great
Britain in Northern Ireland against the IRA, measures which both failed to enhance
security or to defeat the IRA. The authors advocate "[dlialogue, cooperation, and
attention to civil liberties as necessary and effective elements in the strategy to
eliminate terrorism"); Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN
AFF., July-Aug. 2002, a t 127, 140 (concluding that "[sltate building trumps terror,"
requires the cooperation of many states, and cannot be done "on the cheap"); cf. Philip
A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers, 9/11: USA AND UK,26 FORDHAM
INT'LL. J. 1193, 1228 (2003) (quoting Christopher Hewitt's extensive study of British
counter-terrorism measures, THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF ANTI-TERRORIST
POLICIES (1984)
("heavy handed repression is counter-productive")).
As one commentator has observed concerning how the then impending war in Iraq
was being viewed by U.S.Muslims and others:
If 1 percent of that one billion [the world population of Muslims] felt that they
had sympathy for extremist views, then we are dealing with 10 million people.
And if 10 percent of those 10 million were a little more active in pursuing those
extreme beliefs and views, then we are dealing with a potential pool of one
million people from which extremist groups and terrorists can recruit.
Michele Norris & Melissa Block, All Things Considered: How a Potential War with Iraq
Is Being Viewed by American Muslims and Others (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, Mar.
14, 2003) (quoting Hussein Hakani of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),
available in LEXIS, National Public Radio Newsfile.
210.
But see Anthony Cordesman, How Should the United States Respond to
Terrorism, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY FORUM, Nov. 27, 2000, a t 16, at
www.artitranscripts.com (last visited June 3, 2003) (arguing that "law enforcement
partnerships are extremely political, extremely limited, often inherently corrupt . . .").
Religious terrorists may also be less subject to societal constraints than secular
terrorists:
Whereas secular terrorists attempt to appeal to a constituency variously
composed of actual and potential sympathizers, members of the communities
they purport 'to defend' or the aggrieved people for whom they claim to speak,
religious terrorists are a t once activists and constituents engaged in what they
regard a s a total war. They seek to appeal to no other constituency than
themselves. Thus the restraints on violence that are imposed on secular
terrorists by the desire to appeal to a tacitly supportive or uncommitted
constituency are not relevant to the religious terrorist.
HOFFMAN,supra note 179, a t 94-95
211.
See infra note 287 (citing European Court of Human Right's decision in the
Ocalan case); see also CARR,supra note 183, a t 43 (''This presents us with another
enduring truth about the tactics of terror [should a State be tempted to respond
therewith]; they must never be viewed as an expedient or a controllable instrument of
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Putting it another way, "[Tlhe first principle of responding to
unlimited warfare against civilians is . . . not to respond with similar
behavior."212 Otherwise, we risk inflaming the Islamic world.
Unfortunately, the invasion of Iraq, a Muslim country (albeit with a
secular regime) is likely to create such a response.213 Likewise,
executing members of a terrorist group like a1 Qaeda invites
retaliation in kind. As one commentator has noted, "[R]eprisal begets
reprisal."214 We have seen, in other theaters, retaliatory strike
followed by retaliatory attack from the other side, devolving into a
vicious cycle of seemingly ever-increasing violence.215 Experience
suggests that executing a1 Qaeda members would help create such a
cycle.216 We should adopt, not only with use of our military but also

policy, one which, after its purpose is served, will simply burn itself out."); Koh, supra
note 209, a t 1509 (noting that United States joined with the European Union in
demanding that Turkey not execute notorious Kurdish Terrorist Abdullah Ocalan);
Richard Falk, A Roadmap for War: A Flawed Debate, Sept. 27, 2002, available a t
http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/awedDebate.html
(last visited
Mar. 13, 2003). Cf. LEWIS,supra note 67, at 103-12 (noting that many in Islamic world
have criticized West and particularly United States for applying double standard to
Muslims and Muslim states).
212.
CARR,supra note 183, at 231 (emphasis added).
213.
See Iraq War Helped Boost A1 Qaeda, TORONTO STAR, May 20, 2003, a t A1
(quoting Paul Wilkinson, head of Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence a t St. Andrew's University in Scotland: "The political masters in U.S. and
Europe underestimated the extent to which bin Laden would use the war in Iraq as a
propaganda weapon to rejuvenate the movement and attract more funds."); Steven R.
Weisman, U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES,Oct.
1, 2003, a t A1 (quoting a Bush Administration panel, "[h]ostility toward America has
reached shocking levels" as a result of the Iraq war and increased tension in the Middle
East). Many had predicted this outcome:
A U.S. invasion of Iraq would likely trigger a surge in the already prevalent
anti-Americanism in the Middle East, strengthening the hand of hard-line
Islamist groups and provoking many Arab government to tighten their grip,
rather than experiment more boldly with political liberalization."
Carothers, supra note 209, a t 93. Don Van Natta Jr. & Desmond Butler, Threats a n d
Responses: Terror Network: Anger on Iraq Seen a s New Qaeda Recruiting Tool, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at A1 (noting that officials in the United States, Europe, and
Africa observed that the then imminent invasion of Iraq caused a sharp increase in
efforts "to identify and groom a new generation of terrorist operatives" and the officials
worry that the invasion of Iraq "is almost certain to produce a groundswell of
recruitment for groups committed to attacks in the United States, Europe and Israel").
But see Fouad Ajami, Iraq a n d the Arabs' Future, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, a t 2
(arguing that the United States need not apologize for its unilateralism and that the
focus of the invasion "should be modernizing the Arab world).
214. R.C. HINGORANI, PRISONERS
OF WAR 65 (1982).
215. "[Mleeting the tactics of terror in kind will only perpetuate the cycle of
terrorist violence . . . . " CARR,supra note 183, a t 23.
216.
See infra notes 237-67 and accompanying text. Note that in obvious
retaliation for imposing a death sentence on Omar Sheikh, for killing Daniel Pearl,
nine Pakistani police officers were wounded from four letter bombs sent to the station;
one police officer lost his hand. FOUDA
& FIELDING,
supra note 43, a t 70. After receiving
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with the use of the death penalty, an approach that is most likely to
gain the cooperation of our allies and most likely to isolate a1
Qaeda.217
Achieving our strategic objective requires that we give both the
fact and appearance of treating any accused Muslim fairly. For
example after Britain established internment without trial in
Northern Ireland in 1971 to combat the Irish Republican Army, a
policy that was largely directed only a t the Northern Irish Catholic
community, support for the IRA increased: "The use of internment
effectively alienated a sizeable minority of the population of Northern
Ireland and made impossible any cooperation with authorities."218
If we ultimately use the vague doctrines of conspiracy and of
willful blindness to impose the death penalty on an actor who did not
directly participate in the September 11 conspiracy, such a n
execution will be perceived by Muslims as anything but fair. Even if
the evidence ultimately shows that the individual not only directly
participated in the planning of the September 11 attacks but also
played a major role, resorting to the death penalty will likely be
deemed by Muslims a s unjust.219
C. Using the Death Penalty to Punish Politically Motivated Terrorists
1. Creating Martyrs

Making individuals martyrs by killing or executing them has
throughout history often advanced the cause of repressed political

a series o f death threats, Sheikh's Pakistani prosecutor resigned and is "under constant
police guard." Id. at 70.
This approach would require:
217.
[Olbtaining as much specific local information as possible and then, perhaps
through the use o f native 'subcontractors,' convincing people that linking their
future to bin Laden is a bad idea. I t would have to be a slow, careful, patient
process that combined punishment o f specific violent people with the offer of
rewards for potential allies o f the West. None o f this would alter the strategy of
attempting to disrupt bin Laden's access to money and electronic
communications and forestall further attacks. But, for the present, quiet is
America's friend, killing, of Americans by bin Laden, and of Arab civilians by
Americans, is bin Laden's friend, because it draws ordinary people as well as
combat troops to his side.
Lemann, supra note 208, at 36 (emphasis added).
218.
O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 2, at 1680; see also Frontline: British
Actions [in Northern Ireland] (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1997), available
at http:llwww.pbs.orglwgbh/pageslfrontlinelshowsliralconflictrits.html [hereinafter British Actions] (quoting t h e Northern Ireland Chief o f Police, who described
the internment policy as "a disaster").
219.
See infra notes 237-67 and accompanying text.
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groups. For example, Great Britain's execution in 1916 of all fifteen
leaders and others involved with the Easter rebellion led to the
formation of the Republic of Ireland five years later.220Apparently
Osama bin Laden was greatly influenced by Sayyid Qutb, a religious
leader who espoused Salafiyya, the central doctrine of Wahhabishm,
a "highly regressive monolithic interpretation of Islam."221 Qutb has
been described a s "the real founder of Islamic fundamentalism in the
~ ~ called for martyrs to the cause of Islamic
Sunni ~ o r l d . " 2He
revolution: "Those who risk their lives and go out to fight, and who
are prepared to lay down their lives for the cause of God are
honorable people, pure of heart and blessed of
Although he
had opportunities to flee the country right before his arrest, Qutb
refused and was executed in 1966 by Egyptian president, Jamal Abd
al-Na~ser.~~~

220.

The effect of the executions on Irish people was electric:

[Tlhousands of people who ten days ago were bitterly opposed to the whole Sinn
Fein movement, and to rebellion, were now becoming infuriated against the
Government on account of these executions. . . . It is not murderers who are
being executed; it is insurgents who have fought a clean fight, a brave fight,
however misguided, and it would be a damned good thing if your soldiers were
able to put up a s good a fight a s did these men in Dublin-three thousand men
against twenty thousand with machine guns and artillery.
TIM PATCOOGAN,
THEIRA 88 (2002) (quoting John Dillon of Irish Parliamentary Party
and noting that there were in fact far fewer than 3000 rebels). Coogan also observed
that the "indiscriminate roundup of suspects after the rising, had . . . involved so many
innocent along with the guilty that alienation from Westminster was given a further
powerful impetus." Id.
221.
See Amanat, supra note 67, a t 36-37. The doctrine of Salafiyya "and its
articulation by Sayyid Qutb gained an overwhelming currency among Islamic radicals
in the early 1980s." Id. at 37. An eminent legal scholar has discussed martyrdom in a
legal context:
Martyrdom is an extreme form of resistance to domination. As such it reminds
us that the normative world building which constitutes "Law" is never just a
mental or spiritual act. A legal world is built only to the extent that there are
commitments that place bodies on the line. The torture of the martyr is a n
extreme and repulsive form of the organized violence of institutions. It reminds
us that the interpretive commitments of officials are realized, indeed, in the
flesh. As long a s that is so, the interpretive commitments of a community which
resists official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh of its
own adherents.
Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604-05 (1986) (citations
omitted).
222.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, at 169; see also Berman, supra note 204, at 24.
Berman, supra note 204, at 33.
223.
supra note 202, a t 170. Anwar a1 Sadat had
224.
Id.; see also ARMSTRONG,
presided at his trial before Sadat became Egyptian president. Sadat was apparently
assassinated by Muslims linked to the present a1 Qaeda for, among other things, his
role against Qutb. See id.
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Great Britain, Israel, and Germany, all democratic countries
threatened by terrorist groups, have rejected pleas for reinstatement
of the death penalty. In the early eighties when British Parliament
was considering a death penalty bill, James Prior, former Secretary to
Northern Ireland, wrote to conservative supporters in Parliament, "I
believe that the execution of terrorists in Northern Ireland would act
as a new inspiration for the IRA and other extremists."225
Conservative British Prime Minister John Major opposed efforts to
bring back the death penalty in 1990 and 1994. Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin noted that Israel had not judicially executed
"a single terrorist."226 German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt likewise
fought against those who attempted to reinstate the death penalty
"during the reign of terror brought by the Red Army faction."227
Because nineteen hijackers were willing to kill themselves to
carry out these crimes, the threat of the death penalty, if limited to
actual perpetrators, is not likely to deter similar actors in the
future.228In fact, in a perverse way, the death penalty might actually
encourage such actors, standing deterrence theory "on its head."229If
caught, they can still be martyrs after being executed by the
government of the United States.230 In fact, executing them may

225. See Thomas M . McDonnell, A Potentially Explosive Execution, NAT'LLAW J .
July 7 , 1997, at A17. Portions o f this section are drawn from this op-ed piece that I
wrote i n connection with the Timothy McVeigh execution.
226. Id. Although neither Great Britain nor Israel has used capital punishment
against convicted terrorists, some allege that their armed services have carried out
extra-judicial executions. See COOGAN,supra note 220, at 575-82; For the Sake of
Democracy, Britain's 'Dirty War' Must be Investigated, IRISH TIMES,May 21, 2003, at
14; Israel and the Occupied Territories. Israel Must End its Policy of Assassinations,
(Amnesty International) July 4, 2003, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/
ENGMDE150562003 (last visited Aug. 6 , 2003); Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 107-11
(2003). But see J . Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism, 'Targeted Killings'
Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2002) (arguing that terrorists
are legitimate military targets, that "targeted killings" are justified b y self-defense,and
that such killings do not amount to prohibited killing by "perfidy");Louis Rene-Beres,
On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRAL. REV.
321 (1991) (reaching a similar conclusion). Israel has imposed the death penalty only
once, on Adolf Eichman, the author of the "Final Solution." Attorney General of Israel
v. Eichmann, Israel, Supreme Court 1962, 36 INT'LL. REP. 277 (1968), available i n
PAUST
ET AL., supra note 179, at 868.
227. McDonnell, supra note 225.
228. But see Green et al., supra note 172, at 225 (comments of Kenneth Roth)
(noting lack o f enthusiasm that a1 Qaeda leaders have for serving as suicide bombers
themselves).
229. Id. at 194 (comment of David Bruck).
230. As one noted capital defense attorney stated:
Having been involved directly, as defense counsel, i n one o f the a1 Qaeda
prosecutions, I can tell you that i n t h e world o f martyrdom it doesn't get any
better than to be captured b y the United States, brought to New York, or to

Heinonline - - 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.

402 2004

20041

DEA TH PENA L TY

403

elevate such persons to the status of true martyrs, a t least in Muslim
eyes.231 Furthermore, a s one commentator observed, "Terrorism is
theatre."232Trial followed by execution in the United States may put
the potential terrorist and his or her movement on a world stage.
Witness, for example, the Bali bomber's reaction to his conviction and
death sentence in Indonesia in August: "Arnrozi," as he is known, was
beaming with his both hands giving the thumbs up a s if he had just
won a n academy award.233 His picture appeared in the New York
The nineteen individuals who carried out the September 11
attacks intentionally killed not only themselves, but also over three
thousand innocents. Although we may accurately describe the
nineteen a s suicidal mass killers, many in the Arab and Islamic
worlds probably believe that the nineteen combine martyrdom with
Thus executing a n actor like Moussaoui
rebellion and rev0lution.~3~
might run counter not only to the Supreme Court's death penalty
cases but also to a strategic objective, eliminating support in the
Muslim world for acts of terrorism.236

Alexandria, Virginia, tried on a world stage, and then ritually put to death by
the United States. That's the gold standard of martyrdom. For someone who
considers blowing himself up on a plane to be a good thing, getting executed by
the United States is a s good a s it gets.
Id. at 194 (comments of David Bruck).
231.
See LEWIS,supra note 179.
Those who are killed in the jihad are called martyrs, in Arabic and other
Muslim languages shahid . . . The Arabic term shahid also means 'witness' and
is usually translated 'martyr' . . . In Islamic usage the term martyrdom is
normally interpreted to mean death in a jihad and its reward is eternal
bliss. . . Suicide, by contrast, is a mortal sin and earns eternal damnation,
even for those who would otherwise have earned a place in paradise.
Id. at 38.
HOFFMAN, supra note 179, a t 132 (quoting Brian Michael Jenkins,
232.
International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in INT'L TERRORISM
AND WORLD
SECURITY 16 (1975)).
233.
Jane Perlez, Court Decides to Sentence Bali Bomber to Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2003, a t A8.
234.
Id.
235.
Professor Cover noted a s follows:
Martyrdom is not the only possible response of a group that has failed to adjust
to or accept domination while sharing a physical space. Rebellion and
revolution are alternative responses when conditions make such acts feasible
and when there is a willingness not only to die but also to kill for a n
understanding of the normative future that differs from that of the dominating
power.
Cover, supra note 221, a t 1605 (citations omitted).
236.
See infra notes 237-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Aimal
Kasi execution and an analogous British execution of a supposed American.
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Reaction to a U.S. Execution

The case of Aimal Khan Kasi suggests how executing politically
motivated terrorists may influence the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Apparently "upset" with U.S. air attacks on Iraq and with the Central
Intelligence Agency's involvement in Muslim countries,237 Aimal
Kasi, in 1993, opened fire with an AK-47 assault rifle a t Central
Intelligence Agency headquarters, intentionally killing two unarmed
CIA employees a s they were driving to work and wounding three
others.238 Kasi fled to his native Pakistan on the day following the
shooting and remained a t large for four and a half years, traveling in
Afghanistan and occasionally returning to Pakistan.239 I n 1997,
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents abducted Kasi from his hotel
in Pakistan and arranged for him to be flown by military aircraft to
the United S t a t e ~ . ~ Presumably
~o
because Congress had not
reinstated the death penalty under federal law as of the time of the
killings,241the FBI handed Kasi over to the State of Virginia. He was
subsequently tried for murder in a Virginia state court, convicted,
and sentenced to death.242
Religious and tribal leaders in Baluchistan called on Islamabad
and Washington to commute the sentence.243 In the days before
Kasi's scheduled execution by lethal injection, Quetta, a Pakistani
city with over a million inhabitants and Kasi's hometown, was

237.
Kasi characterized his actions as "'between jihad and tribal revenge,' jihad
against America for its support of Israel and revenge against the CIA, which he
apparently felt had mistreated his father during Afghanistan's war against the
Soviets." Stern, supra note 205, at 27.
Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 490, 491 (4th Cir. 2002).
238.
239.
Id. a t 491.
Id. Kasi's motives have been described a s typical of those bent on engaging
240.
in terrorist activities against the United States:
[Tlhe reasons that drove Kasi to kill are very similar to those commonly used to
justify anti-American acts of terrorism. Kasi said he was angry about the
United States' policies abroad, believing that it was bent on destroying
Muslims. He deliberately targeted the CIA because, in his eyes, it was one of
the prime instruments of that destruction.
Iffat Malik, An Uncertain Start, AL-AHRAM WKLY., Nov. 21, 2002, available at
http:Nweekly.ahram.org.eg/print12002/613/inl.htm (last visited July 15, 2003). But see
Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that in his confession Kasi
stated he targeted the CIA not only because of his anti-American views, but also
because he knew CIA workers were unarmed).
241.
Although Congress had enacted a limited death penalty statute in 1988
dealing with so-called "drug king-pins," it did not enact a broad death penalty statute
until 1994. See The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 5 3591 et seq.; see also
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,21 U.S.C. 5 848(e)-(r) (providing penalty of death for
drug king-pins under certain circumstances).
242.
Kasi, 300 F.3d a t 490.
Id.
243.
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"rocked by protests."244 In the day following the execution, Quetta
was "complete[ly] shut down" by Pakistani authorities.245 The
protests were echoed in other parts of Pakistan.246Hundreds of men,
wearing black armbands, walked behind the ambulance carrying
~ ' Quetta Trade
Kasi's body upon its arrival in P a k i ~ t a n . ~The
Association called for a half-day strike on the day of his funeral
beca'use, a spokesperson for the Association declared, "A son of
Baluchistan has embraced martyrdom."248 Apparently, more than
10,000 people attended his funeral, which was held in a stadium.249
The U.S. Department of State issued a worldwide warning t h a t Kasi's
execution "could trigger retaliatory attacks on the US or on other
foreign interests overseas."250On the Friday after Kasi's execution, a
bomb exploded in the southern Pakistani city of Hyderabad, killing
two people a t a bus stop.251The bomb was reportedly retaliation for
Kasi's execution.252

244. Pakistan on Alert After US Execution (BBC News television broadcast, Nov.
15, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uW2/lo~/south~asia/2480009.stm
(last visited
July 13, 2003).
245. Pakistan City Mourns Execution (BBC News television broadcast, Nov. 15,
2002), available at http:Nnews.bbc.co.uW2/lowlsouth~asia/2480327.stm
(last visited
July 13, 2003).
246.
See Pakistanis i n Death Row Protest, (BBC News television broadcast, Nov.
11, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uW 2/low/south~asid2445307.stm(last visited
July 13, 2003); see also Pakistanis in Karachi protest the execution of Mir Aimal Kasi i n
the US, AL-AHRAM WKLY., Nov. 21, 2003, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/61
3Iinl.htm.
247.
Carlotta Gall, World Briefing - Asia: Pakistan: Body of Man Executed i n
U.S. Is Back, N.Y. T I M E SNov.
,
19, 2002, at A18; Thousands Receive Aimal Kasi's Body
as a Hero and a Martyr, DAILY T I M E S(PAKISTAN), Nov. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.ummahnews.com/print.php?sid=272
(last visited June 20, 2003).
248. Id.
249. Mazhar Abbas, Thousands Mourn Executed Pakistani, I&RICA.COM,
available at http://www.iafrica.com/newslworldnews~l87519.htm
(last visited Feb. 20,
2004).
250.
See Pakistanis i n Death Row Protest, supra note 246; State Department,
U.S. Mission t o Pakistan, U.S. Embassy Islamabad, Warden Notice 3/4/2002, at
http://usembassy.state.gov/postslpkllwwwhwardenl1212002.html(last visited July 23,
2003); see also State Department Press Releases and Document, FED. INFORMATION A N D
NEWS DISPATCH,
Nov. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25973321 (press briefing with
Philip T . Reeker, Deputy Spokesperson for State Department).
251. Malik, supra note 240.
252. Id.; see also Thousand Receive Aimal Kasi's Body as a Hero and Martyr,
supra note 247. In addition, four U.S. oil company employees were assassinated i n
Karachi on November 11, 1997, two days after Kasi's conviction, apparently i n
retaliation. Bill Baskervill, Pakistani who Killed CIA Agents i n '93 is Executed, Appeal
Rejected; Reprisals Feared, BOSTONGLOBE,Nov. 15, 2002, at A2, available at 2002 W L
101983863; see also Oliver Roy, Hazy Outlines of a n Islamist International:
Fundamentalists without a Common Cause, LE MONDE, Oct. 1998 (Barry Smerin
trans.), available at http://mondediplo.com/1998/10/04afghan?var~recherche=%22hazy
+outlines%22 (last visited July 22, 2003). Harakat a1 Ansar, a group with connections
to the "Afghancamps," claimed credit for the assassinations. Id.
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Some point out that refusing to execute terrorists may still lead
to retaliatory strikes or violent efforts to free them from prison.253 I
do not claim t h a t violence would never come from imposing long
prison terms rather the death penalty,254but I suspect that the risk
of violence is likely greater from imposing death, particularly in the
context of religiously motivated suicide bombers.255 Aside from the
possibility of retaliatory strikes, as the Kasi case shows,,,,death
sentences almost certainly provoke a much greater resentment and
anger in the community and country, if not, in this case, the Islamic
world from which the executed individual c 0 m e s . ~ ~ 6
3. The Robbins Case-Early

U.S. Reaction to a British Execution

Demonstrating empirically that imposing the death penalty will
inflame the Islamic world cannot be done. Aside from the Kasi case,
a n example from our own history does, however, suggest that
imposing the death penalty on politically motivated terrorists is likely
to have such a n effect. The outrage that much of the Muslim world
may feel if we execute members of a1 Qaeda probably resembles the
outrage much of the United States felt when a U.S. court acceded to
President John Adams' request to extradite a sailor, Jonathan
Robbins (also known a s Thomas Nash), to the British in 1799.257The
United States having surrendered him, the British took Robbins to
Jamaica for trial. The day Robbins reached Jamaica, a Thursday, the
British started his trial for murder and mutiny. On the following
Monday, they hung him and left him hanging in chains for all to
see.258 The extradition and execution led to a public outcry, to

253.
See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Jr., String Them Up, NAT'L REV., June 6,
2003, at Vol. LV, No. 13, available at http://www.nationalreview.comlbuckley/
buckley060603.asp.
254.
For example, a1 Qaeda members have kidnapped western tourists and
hijacked at least one airliner for the sole purpose of freeing other extremist
fundamentalists from prison. See FOUDA
& FIELDING,
supra note 43, a t 60-63 (noting,
among other things, that six Western tourists were kidnapped by Kashmiri rebels with
links to a1 Qaeda in southern Kashmir and were almost certainly killed when Indian
authorities refused to release 15 jailed Islamists).
255.
Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (recognizing that
"death is different," specifically stating, "Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two").
256.
See supra notes 237-254 and accompanying text and infra notes 257-67 and
accompanying text.
257.
United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
258.
Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100
YALE L.J. 229, 233-35 (1990).
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attempts to censure and impeach President Adams, and greatly
contributed to his defeat by Thomas Jefferson the following year.259
Robbins was alleged to be the bosun's mate of the ship Hermione,
a British ship of war.260 Hermione's captain was a Captain Bligh,
infamous for the harsh measures he adopted in treating his crew.
After the captain threatened to flog the last topman to reach the deck,
causing two crewmen in the rush to fall to their deaths, the crew
m~tinied.~6-l
However, the mutineers not only killed the despised
captain, they killed three lieutenants, the purser, the ship's doctor, a
midshipman, the boatswain, and a lieutenant of the marines.262
Robbins apparently played a leading role not only in the mutiny but
also in the homicides263 The mutineers later sailed the ship to what
is now Venezuela and surrendered the ship to the Spanish
authorities, then the enemy of Great Britain.264
Robbins claimed to be a U.S. citizen and claimed to have been
impressed into the British Navy.265 With memory of the war of
independence fresh, many Americans felt that Robbins was a victim
of British tyranny. Americans apparently never seriously questioned
his direct complicity in the killing of the captain and his officers.
Nevertheless, many Americans were apparently appalled by the
President's role in turning Robbins over to then hated super-power,
Great Britain, to carry out Robbins' prompt execution.
Robbins was not a mass murderer, but he was a leader in a
conspiracy that took nine lives. His apparent guilt did not quell the
anger that many Americans felt towards Adams and Great Britain.
The apparent guilt of a1 Qaeda is not likely to quell the anger that
many Muslims would feel if the current super-power executes a1
Qaeda members. The Robbins affair resembles the political offense
exception to extradition, "reflecting [in part] a concern that
individuals-particularly
unsuccessful rebels-should
not be
returned to countries where they may be subjected to unfair trials
and punishments [usually the death penalty]."266

259. Id. at 354-61; see also Michael Edmund O'Neill, Article 111 and the Process
Due a Connecticut Yankee before King Arthur's Court, 76 MAR@L. REV.1, 43-44 (1992).
260. Wedgwood, supra note 258, at 224.
261. Id. at 236 n.9 (citing Instruction of Lord Grenville to British Minister
Robert Liston (Oct. 7 , 1796), i n Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States
1791-1812, 3 Ann. Rep. Am. Hist. Ass'n 122 & n.56 (B. Mayo ed. 1936), reprinted as
H.R. Doc. No. 13, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)).
262. Id.
263.
Id. at 305-06.
264.
Id.
265. T h e evidence the British put forward suggests that h e was probably Irish
and that he probably enlisted. Id.
Quinn v . Robinson, 783 F.3d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing M. BASSIOUNI,
266.
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLDPUBLIC
ORDER 425 (1974)). Note, however,
that the political offense exception generally may not be successfully invoked by
individuals who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. See Quinn v .
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Given the magnitude of September 11 attacks, one could credibly
argue that the death penalty is a "fair punishment." Yet one could
make a similar argument about Robbins, particularly in 1799 when
the death penalty was carried out in a greater percentage of the
cases. Although the reports suggest that Robbins directly participated
in the killing of innocents, the political undertones and U.S. notions
about the right to rebellion help explain Americans' outrage. It is
hard to deny that similar political undertones exist thraughout the
Islamic world in the context of the current conflict between a1 Qaeda
and the United States.
At the time of the Robbins incident, the United States had a
democratic process Americans could resort to, to channel their
outrage. Not only was Adams defeated, but no one was extradited by
the federal government for more than forty years afterwards.267The
countries making up the Islamic world, however, generally do not
possess such a democratic process. There is all the more reason to
believe, therefore, that Muslim outrage and resentment about such
executions might be channeled towards extra-legal means and
groups.
4. Venue Decision and Its Possible Impact in the Muslim World

The Justice Department chose the most pro-prosecution venue in
indicting not only Moussaoui, but also John Walker Lindh, the
"American Taliban."268The Justice Department has laid venue in the
Eastern District Court of Virginia, with generally pro-prosecution
judges and a conservative jury
That district lies within the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the most conservative and proprosecution of all the federal circuit courts of appeals.270This decision

Robinson, 783 F.2d at 799; Eain v . Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 523 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). As demonstrated above, those involved with the
September 11 attacks have committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, or both.
See supra notes 179-190 and accompanying text. Some o f Robbins' acts resemble war
crimes, i f one analogizes his and his conspirators' treatment of the captives to
treatment of prisoners o f war. Y e t t h e heinousness of his crimes did not apparently
assuage t h e U.S. reaction. Quinn, 783 F.3d at 793.
267. Wedgwood, supra note 258, a t 361. Professor Wedgwood argues that
President Adams did not deserve t h e reaction he received given a full study o f the
actual facts o f t h e case. Id. at 362.
268.
See Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37a (E.D. V a . Feb. 5, 2002),
available at http://news.findlaw.com~hdocs/docs~indh/us~1indh020502~mp.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 25, 2003).
269.
See Don V a n Natta, A Nation Challenged: The Legal Venue: Compromise
Settles Debate Over Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B1.
270.
Philip Shenon, After the War: the Courts; Hearing to Affect Government's
Ability to Try Terror Suspects i n Civilian Courts, N.Y. TIMES,June 2, 2003, at A12
(noting t h e conservative reputation o f t h e Fourth Circuit); John Gibeaut, Prosecuting
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was not an accident. The government could have laid venue in New
York, where the overwhelming number of people were killed, but
reportedly chose the Eastern District of Virginia, because of its
"strong record of imposing the death penalty."271 New York federal
juries, on the other hand, had been reluctant to give the death
penalty in other terrorist cases.272
The New York Times reported that the venue decision helped
Michael Chertoff, then Chief of the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department, to persuade the Bush Administration to try Moussaoui
in federal court rather than by military
So one could
plausibly argue that the venue decision was the lesser of two evils.274
Ironically, however, the Justice Department's choosing this venue
argues against imposing the death penalty. Selecting the most proprosecution venue for all the defendants will probably be viewed in
the Arab and Islamic worlds a s a cynical ploy to deny the accused a
fair trial. If that district court metes out any death sentences,
Muslims will likely view the Department's choice of such a venue as a
veiled attempt to use the justice system to kill the Muslims
involved.275 In short, the procedural advantages accorded to the
government in a conspiracy276may be considered unjust in the Arab

Moussaoui, 88 A.B.A.J. 36 (2002) (noting the "traditionally conservative" jury pool in
Virginia).
271.
Shenon, supra note 270, a t A12. The Pentagon is located in Virginia. In the
East African embassy bombings case, it was later reported that one juror apparently
misled the district court and refused to consider imposing the death penalty, and
another juror as the sole Jew on the jury feared retaliation from a1 Qaeda and thus
refused to vote for the death penalty. Benjamin Weiser, A Jury Torn a n d Fearful in
2001 Terrorism Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, a t Al.
Id. New York was also reportedly not chosen, because Justice Department
272.
prosecutors believed that the district court there would probably have granted
defendant's motion to change venue. Id.
273.
Van Natta, supra note 269.
274.
See Paust, supra note 188, a t 1. The Bush Administration reportedly has
indicated that they considered transferring Moussaoui to a military tribunal to avoid
the defendants' carrying on in court. See Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt, Threats a n d
Responses: the 9/11 Suspect; White House Weighs Letting Military Tribunal Try
Moussaoui, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, a t A17.
275.
The Justice Department could defend its decision by arguing that using
civilian courts against terrorists is difficult enough, so the Department must use every
procedural advantage at its disposal. Otherwise, the government may be forced to
engage in self-help or in refusing to use the civilian courts a t all and transferring all
these cases to military tribunals.
276.
Professor Johnson concisely explained the weighted advantages that the
prosecutor obtains when seeking a conspiracy charge:
Where there is evidence of conspiracy, the defendant may be tried jointly with
his criminal partners and possibly with many other persons whom he has never
met or seen, the joint trial may be held in a place he may never have visited,
and hearsay statements of other alleged members of the conspiracy may be
used to prove his guilt. Furthermore, a defendant who is found guilty of
conspiracy is subject to enhanced punishment and may also be found guilty of
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and Islamic worlds, a t least when the death penalty is
D. Might Imposing the Death Penalty Thwart Cooperation from Our
Allies?
1. International Cooperation as Essential i n Defeating Terrorism?

September 11 changed the political and strategic landscape in
countless ways, but one of the most significant is the recognition that
the United States needs the help of other countries to fight the war
against terrorism. A1 Qaeda reportedly has cells in over sixty
countries.278To gather intelligence on such a diffused enemy requires
cooperation from many states.279 To apprehend those individuals
requires states that are willing to arrest and either prosecute or, in
some cases, extradite members of the a1 Qaeda conspiracy to the
United States. Furthermore given the decentralized nature of a1
Qaeda, it requires that individual citizens of these states come
forward with information about suspected members and activities of
any crime committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, whether or not he knew
about the crime or aided in its commission.
Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1973).
277.
See supra notes 237-67 and accompanying text.
278.
See Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War; Bush's
Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours after Attack, WASH. POST.
Jan. 27, 2002, a t Al. Note, by the way, that the "surge in recruitment efforts" for a1
Qaeda has been observed most prominently in Britain, Spain, Italy, and the United
States. See Van Natta & Butler, supra note 213, a t 1. The destruction of the Afghan
camps had
one perverse and unintended effect[:] Terrorists and their supporters who had
formerly been concentrated in one known place were dispersed to home regions
and new hideouts like Chechnya, Yemen, East Africa and Georgia's Pankisi
Gorge. Regional commanders of al-Qaeda, says Rohan Gunaratna, author of a
leading book on the network, are now 'operating independently of centralized
control' . . . and no longer depend on anything from bin Laden and his top brass
except for ideological inspiration.
World, TIME, May 26, 2003, a t 26.
"In the fight on terrorism, the United States needs cooperation from
279.
European and Asian countries in intelligence, law enforcement, and logistics." G. John
Ikenberry, America's Imperial Ambition, FOREIGNAFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, a t 44, 58; see
also supra note 209 (collecting authorities noting need for international cooperation);
Sebastian Rotella, THE WORLD 5 Suspects Helped Fund A1 Qaeda, Spain Says, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, a t A3 (noting that in arresting five alleged a1 Qaeda money
launderers, the "Spanish investigation involved close cooperation with authorities in
France, where the Djerba bomber lived, and in Germany. Spanish investigators also
received assistance from U.S., Tunisian, Swiss and Portuguese law enforcement"). But
see Cordesman, supra note 210, a t 16 (minimizing the practical worth of such
cooperation).

Heinonline - - 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.

410 2004

20041

DEA TH PENAL N

411

a1 Qaeda: "The more useful anti-insurgency [and anti-terror] tactic is
to compete, literally door to door, for people's loyalty (with the coinage
of loyalty being willingness to inform on one side or the 0ther)."~~0
The Bush Administration a t least initially recognized the
necessity of international cooperation by immediately ordering the
payment of back dues owed to the United Nations.281 Forming a
coalition rather than unilaterally attacking Afghanistan likewise is
consistent with the need to cooperate with other nations of the world
to stop the menace of terrorism.282With the invasion of Iraq, the
Bush Administration seemed intent, however, on reverting to the preSeptember 11 unilateralist approach to foreign affairs. "In the
international realm, we seem to believe that our claim to national
sovereignty allows us to operate unilaterally-America
first and
foremost, not together or in conformity with a global contract
[comparable to the domestic social contract]."283 Such a n approach
could prove, a t the very least, counter-productive in the war against
a1 Qaeda.284
At a time when we need help from other countries the most,
retaining the death penalty alienates a growing number of countries
that have abolished the death penalty or are taking steps to abolish
or limit it. As of this writing, 112 countries have abolished the death
penalty in law or in practice, while only eighty-three countries retain
the death penalty.285Virtually all of Europe, including many of the
Soviet Union's former satellite states, have abolished the death

See also Lemann, supra note 208, at 36.
Mike Allen & Glenn Kessler, Bush's Tax Cut Proposal Renews Party
Differences; Democrats Object to President's Call for Billions i n Tax Relief as Major
Part of Stimulus Package, WASH. POST, Oct. 7,2001, at A16.
282.
The U.S. forces and planes, however, have carried out the vast majority of
PRESS
the attacks. See Pamela Hess, Afghan Terrorist Camps i n Cross Hairs, UNITED
INT'L, Oct. 9, 2001, available i n LEXIS, News Group File.
283.
Benjamin R. Barber, A Failure of Democracy, Not Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2002, at A19. For a n excellent article detailing the pitfalls of U.S.
unilateralism, see Harold H . Koh, O n American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN.L. REV. 1479,
1526-27 (2003). Professor Koh asks which fork i n the international road the United
States will take:
280.
281.

Will it be power-based internationalism, i n which the United States gets its
way, because of its willingness to exercise power whatever the rules? Or will it
be norm-based internationalism, i n which American power derives not just
from hard power, but from perceived fidelity to universal values of democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law?
284.
See supra notes 191-219 and accompanying text; see also Koh, supra note
283, at 1501.
285.
Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Amnesty International, Website

against the Death Penalty, available at http://web.amnesty.org/pagesldeathpenalty
-index-eng (last visited July 23, 2003).
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penalty.2s6 All our NATO allies, with the exception of Turkey, have
done
Neither Canada nor Mexico has the death penalty. Of the
other thirty-three nations in the Western hemisphere, only the
United States, Guyana, Guatemala, and Belize permit capital
punishment.288 European countries strongly oppose the death
penalty.289 As leading proponents of the four currently operating
international criminal tribunals, the Europeans successfully argued
for banning capital punishment from the sentencing authority of the
International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone.290 Many abolitionist countries refuse to extradite
fugitives to death penalty states absent a n absolute assurance that
the death penalty will not be carried
For example, the Home

286.
The 40-member Council of Europe has required states applying for
admission to abolish t h e death penalty. Russia, Georgia, the Ukraine, Estonia and
other eastern states are or have already taken steps to do so to gain admission to the
Council. See Montenegro Abolishes Death Penalty, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,June 19,
2002 (noting that Montenegro abolished death penalty to fulfill condition of admission
t o Council of Europe), available in LEXIS, News Group File. Furthermore, the Council
of Europe voted to extend the abolition of the death penalty t o wartime offenses. See
European States Drop Wartime Exception to Death Penalty Ban, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE,May 3, 2002, available i n LEXIS, News Group File. Protocol No. 13 to the
European Convention on Human Rights, Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty i n All Circumstances (Vilnius, May 3, 2002), entered into force, July 1, 2003,
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/ju~protl3.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15,
2003) (abolishing death penalty i n wartime as well as peacetime).
The Turkish parliament has, however, recently abolished the death penalty
287.
for offenses committed i n peacetime. See Amnesty International, Turkey: Abolition of
the Death Penalty Welcomed, at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR440362002?
OpenDocument&of=AbolitionCOUNTRIES\TURKEY (last visited Mar. 13, 2003); see
also Ocalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221199 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 12, 2003)
(concluding that imposing death penalty on notorious Kurdish terror group leader,
Abdullah Ocalan, would violate Article 3 of European Convention on Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms, because of unfair trial procedures to which Turkey subjected
him), available at http:/flegal.aptich/MechanismslEurope/European~Court/Death%20
Penaltylec-ocalan-12-03-2003.htm.
288.
lan Clarke, Terrorism, Extradition, and the Death Penalty, 29 WM.
MITCHELL
L. REV. 783,806 (2003).
289.
Ethan Bronner, Power us. Peace: a Clash of Worlduiews; Trans-Atlantic
Tension, INT'LHERALDTRIB., Feb. 1, 2003, at 4.
Somini Sengupta, African Held for War Crimes Dies i n Custody of a
290.
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A6.
291.
The Spanish government has indicated it will not extradite suspected a1
Qaeda members t o the United States absent assurances that the death penalty will not
be sought. See Rotella, supra note 279, at A3; Europe's Doubts, FIN.T I M E SDec.
,
14,
2001, at 20. In 2001, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled against extraditing two
Canadian nationals to the United States absent assurances that they will not be
subject t o the death penalty. United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283, 7 143 (Can.).
See Bruce Zagaris, A. Canadian Supreme Court Rules Suspects Can Be Extradited to
U S Only With Assurances, Extradition Part IV, 17 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT
REP. 145
(Apr. 2001), available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletters file; see also Bruce Zagaris,
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Secretary of staunch ally Great Britain has told U.S. officials that he
"would approve extradition [of suspected terrorists] only if the Unites
States waived the right to impose the death penalty."292The Supreme
Court of Canada has taken the unusual step of requiring the Minister
of Justice of Canada to demand assurances from the United States
that it will not impose capital punishment on Canadian citizens
. ~ g ~ on executing members of a1
whose extradition is ~ o u ~ h t Insisting
Qaeda could thus deprive us of necessary evidence and, in some cases,
of the fugitives themselves.294 In short, our closest allies are
abolitionist states. To the extent that we use the death penalty in the
war on terror we may find those allies reluctant to cooperate fully
with
The threat of an eventual death sentence for Mr. Moussaoui makes it
difficult for any European country to determine how far to cooperate with
the American investigation. Outlawing the death penalty is a condition of
membership to the 15-nation European Union, and the Council of
Europe, which embraces more than 40 countries, not only forbids the

Uruguay Supreme Court Approves Extradition of Suspected Terrorist to Egypt, Counterterrorism Enforcement Cooperation, 19 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 303 (Aug. 2003),
available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletters file, at *1 (noting that Uruguayan Supreme
Court upheld the extradition of the terrorist suspect "after Egypt agreed not to apply
the death penalty or life imprisonment").
292.
U.S. Death Penalty Could Prove Hurdle to Extradition of Terror Suspects
from Britain, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 8, 2001 (statement of David Blunkett, Home
Secretary); cf. Bruce Zagaris, British Court Denies U.S. Extradition Request on
Algerian Pilot i n Alleged Terrorism Conspiracy, 18 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP.6 (June
2002) (noting that British judge refused t o extradite Lotfi Raissi, Algerian national, to
United States on ground that United States failed to provide sufficient evidence that
Raissi participated i n September 11 conspiracy by training one of pilots).
293. Minister of Justice v. Burns, 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 S.C.C. 7 , available at
http://www.canlii.org/cdcaslscc/2001120Olscc7.hmtl;
see also The Soering Case, 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A ) at 217 (1989) (refusing t o extradite German national, accused of
double murder, t o Virginia on ground that "death row phenomenon" there violated
Article 3 of European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms).
294.
See Mohamed Dalvie v. President of the Republic of S. Mr., 2001 (7) SALR
685 (CC) (concluding that a1 Qaeda suspect i n embassy bombings was wrongfully
deported to United States absent receiving assurances that United States would not
impose death penalty and ordering that judgment be sent t o U.S. District Court of
Southern District of New York where suspect was being tried). Should the U.S. Justice
Department decide t o move Moussaoui's case out of federal court and into a military
tribunal, our allies, especially Europeans, might be even more reluctant to extradite a1
Qaeda suspects to the United States. See Toni Locy, Moussaoui Prosecutors Wary of
Tribunal, U S A TODAY,May 14, 2003, at A4.
295. In dealing with other crises, the United States has given assurances that
the death penalty will not be sought i n order to obtain certain fugitives. Israel Agrees to
Extradite Man Sought i n Letter-Bomb Killing, L.A. T I M E SJuly
,
13, 1993, at B10; Keith
B. Richburg, Court i n France Approves Extradition of U.S. Fugitive, WASH.POST, June
29, 2001, at A31 (two instances i n which extradition was approved after death penalty
was taken o f f table). Whether pursuing the death penalty would hinder the
interchange of intelligence and of other matters remains to be seen.
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death penalty but also recently decided that it should not apply even in
wartime.296

A1 Qaeda, however, appears to be attacking not just the United
States, but also other western countries. Since September 11, the
following attacks (among others) linked to a1 Qaeda have taken place:
(1) I n April 2002, a suicide truck bomb exploded a t a Tunisian
synagogue, killing twenty-one people, mostly French and German
vacationers;297 (2) On October 6, 2002, a speedboat packed with
explosives crashed into a French oil tanker moored off the Yemen
coast, piercing both hulls and causing the tanker to dump 90,000
barrels of oil into the sea;298(3) Six days later, bombs detonated a t a
resort in the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200
civilians, including eighty-eight A u s t r a l i a n ~(4)
;~~
On
~ November 28,
2002, militants attacked a n Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya a s well a
making a n attempted missile attack, which "narrowly missed a n
airliner carrying home Israeli vacationers";300(5) On May 12, 2003, a1
Qaeda attacked the living quarters of Western workers in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia;301 (6) On May 16, 2003, suicide bombers
simultaneously carried out several attacks on civilian targets in
Morocco, targeting not only Moroccans, but, possibly, Spanish
nationals as well;302 (7) On August 5, 2003, a bomb blew up the

296.
Steven Erlanger, Traces of Terroc The Intelligence Reports; Germany
Disputes Visit of Qaeda Figure, N.Y. TIMES,June 11, 2002, at A19.
297.
Josh Meyer, Attack i n Saudi Arabia, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A l .
298.
Bill Coffin,Rough Water, 50 RISKMGMNT. MAG., Mar. 3, 2003, at 10 (noting
that on October 6, 2002, a1 Qaeda terrorists "slammed an explosive laded [sic]
speedboat" into French oil tanker moored off coast of Yemen, causing i t to spill oil into
sea); see also Meyer, supra note 297.
299.
Armozi, the alleged mastermind behind the Bali attacks, said at a news
conference after his arrest that he regretted the bombings killed so many Australians
when he intended to target Americans. Death Penalty Sought for Main Suspect i n Bali
Bombings, KYODO NEWS INT'L, July 8, 2003, available i n LEXIS, International
Newsletters file. Aside from blowing u p the discotheque, bombs went o f f inside Patty's
Irish Pub also i n Kuta, Indonesia as well as close t o the U.S. consulate i n Denpasar,
Indonesia. Alleged Field Coordinator for Bali Bombing Goes on Trial, KYODONEWS
INT'L, July 22, 2003, available i n LEXIS, International Newsletter file.
300.
Meyer, supra note 297.
Americans suffered the most casualties i n these attacks carried out by a1
301.
Qaeda, but other foreigners also died. Saudis More Open About Recent Attacks Than
They Were About September 11, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Plus Wires Database.
Along with eight Americans killed i n these attacks, seven Saudis, three Filipinos, two
Jordanians, and one each from Australia, Great Britain, Ireland, Lebanon, and
Switzerland also died. Donna Abu-Nasr, ASSOC. PRESS, May 15, 2003.
302.
T h e Asian Wall Street Journal reported, however, that the low-level
Jordanian a1 Qaeda coordinator of the Moroccan attacks came u p with the targets.
Peter Finn, Story of Moroccan Bombers Is Rooted i n Casablanca Slum, ASIAN WALLST.
J., June 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL-WSJA 55992014. The a1 Qaeda leadership had
apparently informed him that they wanted attacks i n Morocco without specifying any
targets. Id. He chose targets that had Jewish links or were associated with
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Mariott Hotel in Jakarta, capital of Indonesia;303and (8) On March
11, 2004, ten bombs were detonated on four commuter trains in
Madrid, killing over 200 people and wounding over 1,400,
constituting the worst terrorist attack on European soil since World
War II.304Although the Spanish government initially blambed ETA,
the Basque separatist group, the government has arrested, among
others, three Morrocans, one of whom apparently "dealt closely with
a n [all Qaeda cell based in Spain . . . ."305
On November 12, 2002, a n audiotape containing the voice of
Osama bin Laden was broadcast. On the tape, bin Laden expressly
names a s targets Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy,
and the United Kingdom.306 Responding to the threat, European
governments "departed from their relatively circumspect low-key
approach to terrorism alerts and issued stark warnings about
planned attacks in Europe."307
If our allies are also under attack, they might, arguably, not be
so concerned about our position on the death penalty for accused a1
Qaeda killers. For example, France and Germany initially refused to
turn over evidence against Moussaoui to the United States, because
the Justice Department has sought the death penalty in his case.
France and Germany, however, later softened their stance and agreed
to turn over the requested evidence provided it was only used in the
"guilt phase" of the
The change in position, however, might

'<debauchery''-namely, a Spanish restaurant, a Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, a
Jewish social club, and the Jewish cemetery. Id. T h e Farah hotel was also on the list.
Id. A1 Qaeda apparently gave the local coordinator $50,000 to $70,000 t o fund the
attacks. Id.
303. Jane Perlez, The Attack: Group Linked to A1 Qaeda Seen Behind Jakarta
Blast, N.Y. T I M E SAug.
,
7 , 2003, at A12 (noting that 33-storey Mariott hotel was "the
most visibly American building i n the city").
304.
Elaine Sciolino, 10 Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, N.Y.
TIMES,Mar. 12, 2004, at A l ; T i m Golden & Craig S. Smith, Spain Arrests 5 More
Suspects i n Madrid Bomb Attacks, N.Y. T I M E SMar.
,
19, 2004 (noting that the death
toll had risen t o 202).
Golden & Smith, supra note 304, at A12. There is other evidence that is
305.
pointing towards individuals who may be linked to a1 Qaeda as responsible for the
bombings. See id. Furthermore, a n audiotape was broadcast last October, "reportedly"
i n the voice of Osama bin Laden, i n which he directly threatens Spain. Sciolino, supra
note 304, at A l . Spain has been a staunch ally of the Bush Administration and has
sent 1,300 troops to Iraq. Id.; see also Richard Norton-Taylor & Rosie Cowan, Madrid
Bomb Suspect Linked to UK Extremists, T H EGUARDIAN,Mar. 17, 2004, available at
2004 WL 56438604 (reporting that a suspect i n the Madrid bombings met an extremist
Islamist who may have shared a flat with Zacarias Moussaoui i n London).
See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Purported Bin Laden Tape Lauds Bali, Moscow
306.
Attacks, WASH.POST, Nov. 13, 2002, at A l ; see also Stevenson, supra note 8; Sciolino,
supra note 304, at A1 (noting that Osama bin Laden threatened Spain last October).
307. Id. at 75.
308. Germany and France announced their change i n position approximately
two weeks after the Osama bin Laden audiotape was broadcast. Germany had initially
refused t o provide the evidence needed by the U.S. Justice Department for the
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have been primarily due not to the urge to fight a common enemy, but
to U.S. pressure on those two countries, because their governments
were so outspoken in opposing the U.S. and British plan to invade
Iraq.309
To help fight the terrorist threat, the United States and the
European Union have also recently entered into a n agreement to
speed extradition of suspected terrorists to and from the United
States.310 That agreement, however, contains an anti-death penalty

Moussaoui case, because of German law and practice of not doing so in capital cases.
See Steven Erlanger, Traces of Terror: The Terror Trial; German Chancellor Hopes to
Release Evidence Soon, N.Y. T I M E S , June 11, 2002, at A26. Apparently, Germany's
constitutional ban on t h e death penalty prohibits handing over any evidence that
"could lead to a conviction that results i n execution." Id. Germany had apparently
refused to hand over bank transfers that show that Moussaoui was wired money from
Ramzi Muhammad Abdullah bin al-Shibh. Id. The transfers apparently have al-Shibh's
fingerprints o n them. Id. Germany requested assurances that t h e death penalty not be
sought for Moussaoui, but t h e United States rejected that request. Id. France had also
initially indicated that i t would not turn over any evidence on Moussaoui, because the
United States is seeking t h e death penalty. Id. Germany and France, however,
ultimately agreed to hand over t h e requested evidence after receiving assurances that
the evidence would only be used during the guilt phase of the capital trial and not i n
the penalty phase. Dan Eggen, U.S. to Get Moussaoui Data from Europe, WASH. POST,
Nov. 28, 2002, at A19; see also Larry Margasak, U.S. Seeks to Block Moussaoui
Documents, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 27,2003, available at 2003 WL 17302860.
As Moussaoui's standby attorney pointed out, however, t h e jury i n t h e guilt phase
sits for the penalty phase i f a guilty verdict is reached. Id. Evidence heard i n t h e guilt
phase cannot help but influence t h e jury in t h e penalty phase of t h e trial. See Bruce
Zagaris, Germans and French Agree to Give Evidence i n Moussaoui Case Evidence
Gathering and International Human Rights, 19 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT
REP. 21, 22
(2003), available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletter file. The evidence is important to t h e
Government's case:
[The documents] arguably establish important connections between Moussaoui
and a1 Qaeda operatives. In particular, documents i n the possession of German
authorities show money transfers from a member of the Hamburg group that
carried out t h e September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks i n the U.S. In particular,
they include details of two money transfers that totaled $14,000 from Ramzi
Binalshibh, a n alleged member of the a1 Qaeda cell i n Hamburg, to Moussaoui.
Mr. Binalshibh, who is i n U.S. custody, has told U.S. authorities that Moussaoui
was only a backup i n the September 11 plans, because the a1 Qaeda cells did not
view him as trustworthy. T h e French documents include t h e original version of a
dossier showing Moussaoui's childhood and early adult life i n southern France,
including his links with Islamic radicals both there and i n London.
Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
See also Stevenson, supra note 8, at 75; cf. Richard Bernstein, Germany
309.
Offers to Expand Afghan Force of the U.N. Approves, N.Y. T I M E SAug.
,
28, 2003, at A5
(German offer t o send 250 troops t o Kabul "seems likely to help warm relations with
the United States after Germany's opposition to the American military action i n Iraq").
Agreement on Extradition, June 25, 2003, U.S.-E.U., 2003 O.J. ( L 181) 27,
310.
Celex No. 203A0719 (01) bereinafter EU-US Extradition Agreement]. But see
European Convention o n Human Rights, supra note 286 (abolishing death penalty i n
wartime as well as peacetime).
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article that the European states can expect to invoke before
extraditing any individuals to the United States.311Despite a possible
growing perception of a threat from a common enemy, the U.S. resort
to the death penalty resonates deeply within the European
community and almost certainly affects the degree of cooperation we
can expect from abolitionist countries in general, from Canada and
Mexico, and from the citizens and governments of Europe.312
2. U.S. Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

The United States has also angered its allies by refusing to
enforce Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
particularly in death cases.313 That article requires a state-party to

311.

The capital punishment article provides as follows:

Where the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under
the laws in the requesting State and not punishable by death under the laws in
the requested State, the requested State may grant extradition on the condition
that the death penalty shall not be imposed on the person sought, or if for
procedural reasons such condition cannot be complied with by the requesting
State, on condition that the death penalty if imposed shall not be carried out. If
the requesting State accepts extradition subject to conditions pursuant to this
Article, it shall comply with the conditions. If the requesting State does not
accept the conditions, the request for extradition may be denied.
EU-US Extradition Agreement, supra note 310,art. 13.
312. Clarke, supra note 288, at 807; see Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent
Respectnto World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVISL.REV.1085,1130 (2002).
But see Michael Novak, North Atlantic Community, European Community, NAT'LREV.
ONLINE, July 24, 2003, at www.nationalreview.com/novak072403.asp(last visited Feb.
11, 2004) (noting that people of Europe may be in line with people of United States on
death penalty, but that elites in Europe strongly oppose it). Another commentator has
observed the following concerning the different attitudes and policies of the United States
and Europe:
What distinguishes United States from Great Britain, France and Canada is
not the percentage of the population that expresses support for the death
penalty but the intensity of some elements of that support and the distinctive
political structure that exists to translate sentiment into political action at the
state level.
FRANKLINE. ZIMRING,
THE CONTRADICTIONS
OF AMERICANCAPITALPUNISHMENT 136
(2003).
313. Ginger Thompson, Texas Executes Mexican for Murder Despite President
Fox's Plea, N.Y. TIMES,Aug. 15, 2002, at A5. Noting the failure of the Texas police to
advise the executed Mexican national of his right to consult with the Mexican consul,
President Vicente Fox complained that "[nlot only was Mr. Suarez Medina deprived of
his right to the benefit of his country's assistance when he most needed it, but the
Mexican government was also prevented from providing priority assistance that might
have influenced the outcome of his trial." Id. As of August 6, 2003, there were 119
foreign nationals on U.S. death rows. Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign
Nationals a n d the Death Penalty in the United States, Jan. 1, 2004, at
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2003). At least 18 foreign nationals
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inform "without delay" any foreign nationals whom it arrests of their
right to consult with their consular official.314In a string of cases,
U.S. federal and state courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have
rejected challenges to the imposition of the death penalty when local
law enforcement authorities failed to notify foreign nationals of their
right under the Convention to consult their consular officials.315The

have been executed, none of whom apparently received notice of their right to consult
with a consular official from their country. Id.
314.
Article 36 provides a s follows:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State: . . . (b) if he so requests, the competent
authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post
of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner . . . The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature, April 24, 1963, art.
36.l(b), 596 U.N.T.S. 262 (emphasis added); see also U.N. Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res.
431173, U.N. G.A.O.R., 43d Sess. Supp. No. 49, at prin. 16(2), U.N. Doc. A143149 (1988);
U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663(c), U.N.
ESCOR 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, art. 38(1), U.N. Doc. El3048 (1957) (providing
essentially the same right of consular notification and assistance as Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention).
315.
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) (ruling that since Vienna
Consular Convention claim was not raised a t trial in state court, that claim was
procedurally defaulted); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting
challenge under Vienna Consular Convention); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara,
226 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Santos, 235 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Carrillo, 70 F.2d 854, 859 (N.D. Ill. 1999); United States v. HonglaYamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Mass. 1999).
A few state and federal courts have given foreign defendants some limited relief.
See, e.g., United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1979)
(suppressing foreign defendant's statement because police failed to tell defendant of his
right to speak with consular official from his country); State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 24-27
(Del. Super. Ct. 1999) (same). See also United States v. Rangel-Gonzalez, 617 F.2d 529,
532 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that rights established by Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations are personal to defendant); United States v. Lombrera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d
1241 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(concluding that foreign national who is arrested but not informed of his rights under
Vienna Convention has private cause of action under Section 1983); Valdez v. State, 46
P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (granting Mexican national's petition for postconviction relief, reasoning that while the ICJ's judgment in LaGrand did not mandate
abandonment of procedural default rules, failure to provide consular notice, along with
other evidence indicating lack of diligence on part of assigned counsel justified relief
requested). An Ohio Supreme Court justice noted that the policy ramifications of
violating the Convention on Consular Relations:
Our best way to ensure that other nations honor the treaty by providing
consular access to our nationals is to demand strict adherence to the right to
consular access for foreigners in our country. . . If the United States fails in its
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International Court of Justice has ruled that the United States
violated international law in refusing to notify the defendants of their
rights under the Vienna Convention and in refusing to stay the order
of execution pending the outcome of challenges filed by complaining
states in the ICJ.316 Apparent U.S. disregard of the Convention and
the ICJ could make our allies not only less concerned about the rights
of U.S. citizens traveling abroad,317 but also could make them
somewhat less eager3l8 to help us in the war on terror.319

responsibilities under t h e convention, then other member countries may choose
to do unto u s as we have done unto them.
State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St. 3d 49, 80-81 (2001) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting). See
also William J. Aceves & Bernard H . Oxman (ed.), International Decision, LaGrand
(Germany v. United States), 96 AM. J. INPL L. 210, 218 n.48 (2002) (noting that "[iln
September 2001, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stayed the execution of a
Mexican national, i n part because of the purported Consular Relations Convention
violation and the broader implications of the ICJ's ruling) (citing Okla. Court Postpones
Execution of Mexican; International Law Cited i n Ruling, WASH.POST, Sept. 11, 2001,
at A16). William J. Aceves, LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
210, 218 n.48 (2002) (citing Okla. Court Postpones Execution of Mexican; International
Law Cited i n Ruling, WASH. POST,Sept. 11, 2001, at A16).
316. La Grand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 1 (June 27), available at
h t t p : / / w w w . i c j - c i j . o r g / i c j w w w / i d o c k e t / i ~ a m e . h t m (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
Note that on February 5, 2003, the Court granted Mexico's request for provisional
measures against the United States t o stop the pending executions of three Mexican
nationals who likewise were not provided consular advice. Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J. (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://212.153.43.18/
icjwwwlidocketlimuslimusframe.htm;Bruce Zagaris, ICJ Grants Provisional Remedies
for Mexicans on U.S. Death Row, 19 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 148 (Apr. 2003),
available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletters file, at *1, *3 ("Coming only 18 months after
the ICJ decision in LaGrand, the decision indicates that opponents of the death penalty
are gaining momentum i n international courts."). The Right to Information on
Consular Assistance i n the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 16, Advisory Op. 0C-16/99, Ser. A (1999) (reaching same result as
ICJ i n LaGrancE). The U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution by a vote of 121-1
endorsing the Advisory Opinion. See Protection of Migrants, G.A. Res. AIRes154, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. 16624 (2000) ("[tlaking note o f the
decisions of the relevant international juridical bodies on questions relating t o
migrants, i n particular the Advisory Opinion 0C-16/99 issued by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights . . . regarding the right t o information about consular
assistance within the framework of due process guarantees"). See generally Declaration
on the Human Rights of Individual Who Are Not Nationals of the Country i n Which
They Live, G.A. Res. 144, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. AIRes140/144
(1985) (linking consular assistance t o due process). The United States was the only
country to vote against the resolution. Under the purpose and plain meaning o f "the
Supremacy Clause," the LaGrand case is binding on state and federal courts. See U.S.
CONST.art. VI, 3 2.
317.
Our moral standing to argue for the protection of our nationals when they
are arrested abroad is compromised by the judicial rejection of the Vienna Convention.
Note: Too Sovereign but not Sovereign Enough: The U.S. Stales Beyond the Reach of the
Law of Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654, 2677 (2003). That standing has further been
weakened by our apparent unqualified resort t o military tribunals i n virtually all cases
involving the Taliban and a1 Qaeda. Charles V . Pena, Blowback: The Unintended
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The United States is a party to the Convention against Torture,
which prohibits inflicting "extreme pain or suffering whether physical
or menta1."324 There are no exceptions to the Torture Conventi0n.~~5
Under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), a state may in times of emergency derogate from certain
obligations to provide civil liberties.326 The Covenant expressly
prohibits, however, derogation from a state's obligation to refrain
from""subject[ing] [any person] to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."327The United States is also a
party to the ICCPR.328

Adam Liptak, Questioning to be Legal, Humane and Aggressive, the White House Says,
N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 4,2003, at A13. "There are a lot of ways short of torturing someone to
get information from a subject," said one U.S. official. Id. In dealing with other a1
Qaeda suspects, "[tlhe United States has deprived suspects of sleep and light, kept
them in awkward positions f& hours and used psychological intimidation or deception
to confuse and disorient them." Id. The European Court of Human Rights, however,
declared a similar practice engaged in by the British against IRA prisoners to be
"inhuman and degrading treatment," but not "torture" within the meaning of Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 167 (1978).
324.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter
Torture Convention]. Concerning the death penalty, the U.S. Senate attached an
understanding to its advice and consent to the Convention:
That the United States understands that international law does not prohibit
the death penalty, and does not consider this Convention to restrict or prohibit
the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with the Fifth,
Eighth andlor Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, including any constitutional period of confinement prior to the
imposition of the death penalty
United States Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CONG.
REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (U.S. Understanding, II(4)). The U.S. Senate
also attached a reservation purporting to equate torture to violations of the Fifth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution:
That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16
to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only
insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, andlor Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
Id. at I(2).
325. Article 2.2 of the Torture Convention states as follows: "No exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."
Torture Convention, supra note 324, Art. 11.
326.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
concluded Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 4.1, 4.2, 993 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
327. Id. a t 4.2. The Torture Convention itself has a similar provision: "NO
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
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A debate has arisen in the United States, however, over whether
the government should embark on a policy of torture, a t least when
dealing with the so-called "ticking-bomb terrorist."329 One noted
commentator has suggested that, given the stakes, a judicial warrant
exception allowing torture in such narrow circumstances should be
created.330 Some additional respected authorities have indicated that
torture may be justified in "extraordinary circumstance^."^^^ Otheas
have pointed out, however, that identification of such "ticking~bomb
terrorists" is usually difficult, that information provided under
torture is often unreliable, that such a policy would lead to a slippery
slope here (if we can torture suspected terrorists, why not suspected

internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture." Torture Convention, supra note 324, art. 11.
President Bush issued a declaration of national emergency on September
328.
14, 2001, which would presumably comply with the ICCPR, as a result of t h e
September 11 attacks. See Proclamation No. 7463,66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18,2001).
The U.S. Senate attached t o its advice and consent to the ICCPR a similar reservation,
namely, equating torture and degrading treatment with a violation under t h e Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. reservations, declarations, and
understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Reservation I
(3), 138 CONG.REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
T h e ticking bomb terrorist is generally a recently apprehended terrorist
329.
suspect who is potentially able "to disclose information that would prevent a n
imminent and massive terrorist attack." Sung, supra note 322, at 194.
DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 185, at 158-59.
330.
331.
John T . Parry & Welsh S . White, Znterrogating Suspected Terrorists:
Should Torture Be a n Option? 63 U . PITT.L. REV. 743,745 n.8 (2002):
Symposium o n the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods o f
Investigation of the General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist
Activity, 23 ISR. L. REV. 141 (1989) (collecting comments b y Alan Dershowitz,
Sanford Kadish, Michael Moore, and Paul Robinson, all of whom conclude
torture could be permissible i n limited circumstances); Steve Chapman, Should
We Use Torture to Stop Terrorism?, C H I .TRIB.,Nov. 1, 2001, at 31; Michael
James & Peter Hermann, Torture Likely Tool in Anti-Terror Fight, BALT. SUN,
Oct. 10, 2001, at 11A (quoting Professor David Powell's claim that
"[elxtraordinary behavior is necessary under extraordinary circumstances");
Jodie Morse, How Do We Make Him Talk?, T I M EApr.
,
15, 2002, at 44 (quoting
Professor Anthony D'Amato's suggestion that torture may be "required to save
lives" in certain cases); Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses
Dilemma for FBI, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6 (quoting Professor David
Cole's admission t h a t , "[ilfthere is a ticking bomb, it i s not a n easy issue, it's
t o u g h ) ; Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps into Discussion by News Media, N.Y.
T I M E S Nov.
,
5, 2001, at C1 (noting a former deputy attorney general argued, "it
might also be permissible to transfer terrorist subjects to other nations with
different standards o f interrogation"); Patricia Williams, War and the Law, T H E
OBSERVER (London), Dec. 2, 2001 (discussing former Clinton Justice
Department official Robert Litt's argument that torture could be used i n
emergencies even though it is not authorized by law).
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murderers, rapists, and child molesters?),332that it would encourage
other countries to resort to torture, that it violates moral standards
as well as U.S. and international
and that the use of torture
might so anger the religious and ethnic groups of the tortured
individuals that torture will only increase terrorism.334
In Northern Ireland, Great Britain's policy initiated in 1971 of
subjecting mainly members of the minority Catholic community
suspected of IRA activity to internment including degrading
treatment, if not torture, enraged the Catholic community and
provided the IRA with one of its best recruiting tools.335Perceived to
be aimed at that already discriminated-against minority, the policy
"undermined British rule in Northern Ireland."336 Given the ethnic
and religious overtones in the current struggle against a1 Qaeda,
there is substantial reason to believe that the United States'
employing an official or unofficial policy of torture will also
A torture policy may also endanger
strengthen that organi~ation.~~'
U.S. troops who are attempting to arrest or capture a1 Qaeda
members. Such a1 Qaeda operatives would have an additional
incentive to fight to the death rather than lay down their arms.338

332. Peter Maass, The World: Torture, Tough or Lite; If a Terror Suspect Won't
Talk, Should He Be Made To? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2003, D4.
333.
Sung, supra note 322, at 199-210, See Regina v. Bartle (the Pinochet case),
381 I.L.M. 581 (House of Lords, Mar. 24, 1999), i n JORDAN
J. PAUST ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 653, 655 (2000) ("The jus cogens
nature of the international crime of torture justifies states i n taking universal
jurisdiction over torture wherever committed.") (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.); cf. Barbara
Crossette, U.S. Fails i n Effort to Block Vote on U.N. Convention on Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 2002, at A7 (apparently fearing demands for access t o Guantanomo Bay
detention camp, United States unsuccessfully opposed proposed "optional protocol" to
Torture Convention "to establish a system of regular inspections o f prisons and
detention centers worldwide to check for abuses").
334.
Crossette, supra note 333.
See O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 2, at 1663, 1679; see also British
335.
Actions, supra note 218 (noting that "as a result of it [internment],the IRA were able to
recruit young men i n scores if not i n hundreds").
336. British Actions, supra note 218.
337. The U.S. record is hardly spotless. Washington apparently has turned some
terrorist suspects over to countries (such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco) that do
torture. Lichtblau & Liptak, supra note 323. I t is also reported that the United States
has threatened suspects with their being turned over t o such countries t o encourage
these suspects to talk. Id. The New York Times quotes a senior Moroccan intelligence
official as follows:

I a m allowed t o use all means i n m y possession i n interrogating a suspect. Y o u
have to fight all his resistance at all levels and show him that he is wrong, that
his ideology is wrong and is not connected to religion. W e break them, yes. And
when they are weakened, they realize that they are wrong.
Id.
338.

See infra notes 340-51 and accompanying text for a discussion o f this issue.
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Furthermore, given the lengthy delays before trial and the lengthy
appellate process in capital cases, the threat of a remote penalty of
death is not likely to induce the "ticking bomb terrorist!' to reveal the
plot. Furthermore, the death penalty could be counterproductive when
dealing with individuals who are willing to commit suicide to advance
their group's cause. Thus, the lure of martyrdom by the death penalty
might actually encourage such persons to refuse to cooperate.339
2. Placing U.S. Military Personnel and Civilians at Risk

If individuals associated with a1 Qaeda learn that the United
States is executing imprisoned a1 Qaeda members, then U.S.
civilians, military personnel, and federal agents may be a t greater
risk. First, if a1 Qaeda captures any Americans, there may be a
greater chance that they will be killed.340 Second, if a1 Qaeda
members know they will face death by execution, they have a strong
incentive to fight to the death when U.S. military or special agents
are trying to subdue or arrest them in the field.341
These policies rest on the same foundation as some basic rules of
international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions that
protect prisoners of war are based not only on humanitarian
concerns, but also on pragmatic ones. If state A mistreats the
captured soldiers of state B, then state B may be inclined to mistreat
the captured soldiers of A.342 Granted, reciprocity does not always

See supra notes 220-36 and accompanying text.
Green et al., supra note 172, at 219 (Comments of Kenneth Roth, Director of
Human Rights Watch). Note the statement allegedly made by Daniel Pearl's
kidnappers:
339.
340.

The National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty had
kidnapped him [Pearl] and was holding him in 'very inhuman [sic]
circumstances', similar to the way that 'Pakistanis and nationals of other
sovereign countries were kept in Cuba by the American Army. . . If the
Americans keep our countryman in better conditions we will better the
conditions of Mr. Pearl and all the other Americans we capture.
FOUDA& FIELDING, supra note 43, a t 65 (quoting an e-mail message sent reportedly by
the kidnappers of Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter). A second e-mail was
sent threatening the execution of Pearl within 24 hours. Id. Apparently, authorities
believe that Pearl was already dead by the time that the second e-mail was sent. Id.
That executing a1 Qaeda terrorists puts Americans and the U.S. military a t greater
risk cannot be proved empirically. Furthermore, we cannot accept a t face value the
statements made by such individuals. But these and other experiences suggest that
executing or otherwise mistreating a1 Qaeda captives may increase this risk.
341.
Id. at 224.
342.
See George H. Aldrich, Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva
LAW AND RED
Protocols, in STUDIESAND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
CROSSPRINCIPLES
IN HONOROF JEAN PICTET 129,131 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984)
(noting that "it was apparent that mistreatment of North Vietnamese prisoners by the
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happen. During its war with the United States, North Korea and
China routinely mistreated U.S. soldiers and airmen, violating the
third Geneva Convention while the United States generally abided by
it.343 One could readily argue that a terrorist organization like a1
Qaeda is certain to treat captives harshly no matter how well the
United States treats arrested a1 Qaeda members (and a t the moment
we are not treating them well). On the other hand, a1 Qaeda is a
loosely structured organization. Who is to say that some people
associated with that organization might be motivated to treat
captured Americans humanely but for the fact that captured a1 Qaeda
members are being mistreated by the United States (most are being
held incommunicado without trial) and may be subject to
execution.344

South Vietnamese undermined our efforts to obtain better treatment for our men
captured by North Vietnam"). However, there is an opposing view:
The Geneva Conventions are coming to be regarded less and less as contracts
concluded on a basis of reciprocity i n the national interests of the parties . . . A
state does not proclaim the principle o f protection due to prisoners of war
merely i n the hope of improving the lot of a certain number of its own
nationals. I t does so out of respect for the human person.
111 COMMENTARY,T H E GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST1949, GENEVA
CONVENTION
111 RELATIVE TO T H E TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS OF WAR 20 (Jean S. Pictet
ed. 1960). In a colloquy between Professor Ruth Wedgwood of the John Hopkins
University and Professor Jordan Paust of the University of Denver on January 3, 2004,
Professor Wedgwood argued that humanitarian law is based, to a great extent, on
reciprocity. In answer t o a question from the audience, Professor Paust argued that
certain aspects of humanitarian law, the prohibition against torture being the
prominent example, are fundamental rights, not founded on the notion of reciprocity.
The Constitutional and Enemy Combatants, Panel Discussion of the American
Association of Law Schools' Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, Jan. 3, 2003 (attended
by author).
343. Ralph Michael Stein, "Artillery Lends Dignity to What Otherwise Would be
a Common Brawl': An Essay on Post-Modern Warfare and the Classification of
Captured Adversaries, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 133, 146 (2002). North Vietnam
mistreated U.S. captives, but South Vietnam, t o whom we turned over a large
percentage of captured Viet Cong and North Vietnamese fighters generally mistreated
t h e m i n turn. See id. By the way, the American Continental Army i n the War o f
Independence generally treated British captives well, but the British did not return the
favor, viewing the Americans as lawless rebels, not so differently from how the United
States views a1 Qaeda today. See id. at 142.
344. This is not to suggest that all a1 Qaeda and Taliban are necessarily entitled
t o the protection of Geneva Conventions as prisoners o f war. For a discussion of that
issue, see Paust, supra note 188 at 8 n.16; Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to
Fight Terrorism, Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals and the
Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1472-77 (2003). See also, Jonathan D. Glater,
A.B.A. Urges Wider Rights i n Cases Tried by Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at
A18 (noting that American Bar Association called upon Congress and White House to
ensure that all defendants before military tribunals have "adequate access" to civilian
lawyers). But see Ruth Wedgewood, a1 Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328,330 (2002) (defending detentions i n Guantanamo Bay and use o f
military commissions as necessary security measure, noting that "the fabric of
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In addition, humanitarian law prohibits an armed force from
killing soldiers who are attempting to surrender, who have given up,
or who are wounded and otherwise "hors de combat." Thus, a "take no
prisoners" order is per se illegal. Specifically, 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 provides as follows, "It is
prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten a n
adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis."345 This
requirement "to give quarter" also appears in the Hague Regulations
of 1907.346The United States has never ratified Protocol I, but is a
party to the Hague Convention of 1907, including the Annex
containing the Hague Regulations. The requirement "to give quarter"
is considered binding customary international
If the United States embarks on a policy of executing a1 Qaeda
members, it may be viewed by a1 Qaeda members in the field
essentially a s refusing to give quarter. This is not to suggest that
carrying out the death penalty would violate international law or
would in fact violate the provisions referred to above. (The Geneva
Conventions expressly authorize criminal prosecution for war crimes
and crimes against humanity.348 These Conventions, including the
1977 Protocols, permit capital punishment, except for juveniles and
women with dependent infants.349)Nonetheless, one of the benefits
gained by the attacking force in giving quarter, aside from potential
reciprocity, is that the besieged force has greater incentive to lay

American liberalism and democracy would be irreparably coarsened i f government
proves unable t o provide a reasonable guarantee of life and safety to its citizens."); Lee
A. Casey, David B. Rivkin, Jr., & Darin R. Bartram, An Assessment of the
Recommendations of the American Bar Association Regarding the Use of Military
Commissions i n the War on Terror, THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY
WHITE PAPERSON
TERRORISM, at http:llwww.fed-soc.org/PublicationsPTerrorisesponse.p (last
visited Aug. 1, 2003) (criticizing some of ABA recommendations on military
commissions).
345.
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 40, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608, 16 I.L.M. 1391; see also
DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWSOF WAR443 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1989).
346. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of W a r on Land, Annex to
the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting t h e Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, art. 23(2), 36 Stat. 2199 ("In addition to the prohibitions provided by special
Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . (d) To declare that no quarter will be
given . . . .").
347.
L.R. Penna, Customary International Law and Protocol I: an Analysis of
Some Provisions, i n STUDIES
AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAWAND
RED CROSSPRINCIPLES
IN HONOR OF JEAN
PICTET,
supra note 342, at 212.
348.
See, e.g., 1977 Additional Protocol I , supra note 343, art. 75.7, at 465-66
(implicitly authorizing trial o f individuals, including prisoners of war, for war crimes or
crimes against humanity or both). See also Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or
Global Law Enforcement Operation, 78 NOTREDAMEL. REV.307,357 (2003).
1977 Protocol I , supra note 345, art. 77.5, at 467 (prohibiting imposition of
349.
death penalty upon minors, but implicitly authorizing death penalty for adults); id. art.
7 , at 466 (prohibiting execution of death penalty on mothers with "dependent infants").
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down their arms. If they know they are going to be killed in any
event, why not fight to the last? If the besieged force, in this case,
members of a1 Qaeda, believe that they will face execution anyway (or
indefinite detention without trial or both),350 they may be more
motivated to die a glorious warrior's death in battle rather than to go
quietly.351

The thundering weight of the crimes of September 11 inevitably
demands the maximum punishment that our judicial system allows.
If anyone deserves the death penalty, then those who planned and
actively participated in the September 11 conspiracy do. The United
States will almost certainly execute those, like Mohammed Shaikh
Khalid, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Zubaydah, assuming, a s
expected, they are found responsible for the attacks. Yet a s we enter
the third year in the "war on terrorism," the euphoria of the
seemingly quick victory in the largely unilateral war against Iraq is
beginning to give way to recognition that we need the United Nations,
the help of our allies, and respect for the rule of law.
Similarly, the natural demand for retribution after a terrorist
organization has committed mass murder and other heinous crimes
needs to be tempered by the fact that carrying out the death penalty
may strengthen the terrorists. Given the perceived and actual
grievances that the Arab and the greater Islamic worlds have towards
the West in general and the United States in particular, carrying out
such executions will probably tend to inflame the Arab and Islamic
worlds, increase their support of terrorist movements and thwart
cooperation with our allies, almost all of whom have abolished the
death penalty. In addition, assuming the evidence a t trial fails to
show that Zacarias Moussaoui directly participated in the conspiracy
to carry out the September 11 attacks, executing him may be contrary
to our current death penalty jurisprudence and would appear unjust
to our allies and the Islamic world alike. Even if the evidence shows

350.
One could add to this list the possibility of captured a1 Qaeda members
being subject to degrading treatment and torture. See supra notes 320-51 and
accompanying text.
351. Furthermore, the failure to give quarter may ultimately strengthen the
terrorist organization. COOGAN,supra note 220, a t 578. In 1987, Great Britain's Special
Air Services Unit (SAS) lay in wait for IRA members who had planned to blow up a
police barracks in Northern Ireland. Id. a t 575-78. Allegedly carrying out a "shoot to
kill" order, SAS killed nine men, eight IRA members and one innocent bystander who
happened to be Protestant. Id. at 578. Allegedly, SAS ordered three IRA men to lie on
the road and then proceeded to kill each of them. One commentator noted that each of
the eight men's funerals drew enormous crowds and each probably recruited more than
"fifty replacements for the IRAn while greatly increasing support for Sinn Fein. Id.
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t h a t Moussaoui directly participated in the September 11 conspiracy,
executing him will, as the Kasi case so well illustrates, almost
certainly make him the twentieth martyr for Muslims.
Because, however, we routinely carry out executions on
individuals such a s Paul Hill, the anti-abortion killer, who murdered
two persons, a physician and his
how can we not execute
one who, a t the very least, was actively involved in a n organization
that killed over three thousand innocent people? We should, however,
learn from the mistakes and the successes of Great Britain in fighting
the IRA, that executing politically motivated agents of terror is likely
to spawn greater terrorism.353 Such restraint is a surer path towards
isolating a1 Qaeda and its allies in the lands of the aggrieved and the
repressed. The death penalty is a luxury that we can ill afford in this
international struggle.

See David Royse, Abortion Clinics Safe So Far, Police Say; No Credible
352.
Threats Since Execution, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 5 , 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL
62530293.
See COOGAN,supra note 220, at 578.
353.

Heinonline - - 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.

428 2004

DEA TH PENAL N

APPENDIX
Table 1
Possible Conspiracy A:

1
Osama Bin Laden

,
High Level Organizers Ayman al-Zawahri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh

The Nineteen Hijackers + Moussaoui

Table 2
Two Possible Conspiracies B and C:
Osama Bin Laden

High Level Organizers Ayman al-Zawahri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh

The Nineteen Hijackers
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